

# Peace-building in Haiti

*An actor-oriented analysis*

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## List of abbreviations

CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CARICOM	Caribbean Community
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
EU	European Union
Fad'H	Forces Armées d'Haïti
HNP	Haitian National Police
IBL	Institutionalisation Before Liberalisation
IPA	International Peace Academy
MIF	Multinational Interim Force
MINUSTAH	United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti
OAS	Organization of American States
OPL	Organisation Politique Lavalas
UN	United Nations
UNPD	United Nations Development Programme
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
US	United States



# 1 Introduction

The objective of peacebuilding (...) retains a focus on violent conflict (the central concern when peace is defined as the absence of war) but with an interest in the tools a society can develop to manage such conflict authoritatively and legitimately... (Cousens 2001:13)

This thesis assesses the prospects for successful peace-building in Haiti after the election of René Préval as president in 2006. It is an actor oriented analysis of the objectives, strategies and actions of relevant actors during a delimited period of time around the elections in 2006. The period starts with the ousting of former president Jean-Bertrand Aristide on February 29 2004 and ends on October 15 2007, when UN Resolution 1743 ran out.

In her definition of the objectives of peace-building cited above, Cousens (2001:13) mentions “the tools a society can develop to manage conflict authoritatively and legitimately”. Those tools are central in a study which attempts to assess the prospects for peace-building by shedding light on the strategies of a specific set of actors from specific sectors of society. The actors chosen for this analysis are President Préval from the political arena, the United Nations representing the international community and the Group of 184 from civil society. They are all considered significant actors on the Haitian scene between February 2004 and October 2007.

The analysis is based on literature review to assess the post-authoritarian political situation after the fall of the Duvalier-regime, with focus on the abovementioned period around the 2006 presidential elections. The literature review is supplied by qualitative interviews and an informal conversation with key-informants from the Haitian civil society and observers of the Haitian political scene. In what follows I will first present the research questions. Then I will define the concept of peace-building and the scope of the analysis. Thereafter I will comment on the design, before I turn to the empirical foundations for the study. Then follows a discussion

about the contribution of my study, and finally I present the further outline for the thesis.

## 1.1 'Peace-building in Haiti' –the research questions

Ever since Haiti – through modern history's only successful slave revolt – gained independence in 1804, the country has been plagued by political collapse and violent conflict. Since the fall of the Duvaliers in 1986, there have been many attempts – by local as well as external actors – at building peace, but more than twenty years later the country still finds itself in what appears like a perpetual crisis (Robinson 1996:259-316). This perpetual crisis is characterised by extreme poverty<sup>1</sup> and socio-economic division, insecurity due to violent gang activity, and a general state of instability. In this study I discuss the prerequisites for durable peace in Haiti, and evaluate what a selected set of actors do to build peace and whether their respective strategies converge. Five years ago I lived in Haiti and became very fascinated by the country. Writing this thesis is an attempt to get a better comprehension of the situation. In addition, I find the conflict in Haiti interesting because this is not a civil war in the traditional sense, and compared to other, similar cases, relatively little research has been done on the area.

In particular Haitian civil society has received very little attention in research, which is a great challenge to this study. As I will explain more in depth below, Haiti has an *oral* culture, implying that there are very few written sources about neither the activities of Haitian civil society nor Haitian politics. Therefore I find it interesting – and challenging – to focus on actors from civil society and the political arena in Haiti, and their roles in a process of peace-building there. The international community is so present in Haiti that the study would be defective if it was not included in the analysis. Besides, I find the dynamics between these three groups very interesting,

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<sup>1</sup> Haiti is the poorest country in the Western hemisphere. 80% of all Haitians are living under the poverty line (CIA 2007).

and I do believe collaboration amongst them is a key in order to find solutions to the ongoing conflict. The scarcity of literature indicates that Haitian civil society in particular is an understudied area, and that has increased my motivation for the study.

The research question is twofold. To be able to assess the efforts put into peace-building in Haiti by analysing the strategies of a set of actors, I need knowledge about the prerequisites for peace. My first research question is:

***What are the prerequisites for lasting peace in Haiti?***

The second question concerns peace-building and the efforts and intentions of different actors:

***What do actors from the political scene, civil society and the international community do to contribute to a successful process of peace-building? Do their strategies converge?***

## 1.2 Defining peace-building and scope

Based on Cousens' definition of the purpose of peace-building at the outset of this chapter, I define 'a successful process of peace-building' as a process that puts an end to the violent conflict and political collapse in the country. All societies have their conflicts to deal with, and the objective of peace-building is arguably not to clear away *all* conflicts. That would indeed be an overambitious aim. As Cousens puts it: "All societies experience conflict (...) peacebuilding is not designed to eliminate conflict but to develop effective mechanisms by which a polity can resolve its rival claims, grievances, and competition over common resources" (Cousens 2001:12).

Roland Paris on his side defines peace-building as "an *action* undertaken at the *end* of civil conflict to consolidate peace and prevent recurrence of fighting" (Paris 2004:38, emphasis added). That definition arguably is problematic in relation to peace-building in Haiti in at least two ways: First, it appears evident that in Haiti, where the conflict is diffuse and not an outright civil war, peace-building logically must take place

*before* the end of the conflict. How can one say that the end of the conflict is reached if there is not peace yet? Second, because of the complexity that necessarily characterise conflicts, and the multitude of peace-building initiatives that have already taken place in Haiti, I find it incorrect to call peace-building there an *action*. Therefore my definition is based on Cousen's understanding of the concept as a *process*. However, in the theoretical framework I refer to both authors, and I argue that in spite of the differences in their definitions of the concept of peace-building, their approaches to the concept have many points in common.

When it comes to the scope, and the start of the delimited time period, Aristide's departure represents a milestone in Haitian political history. From that date on the conflict took a somewhat new direction, as controversies over whether Aristide should be allowed to return created a new division line in Haitian politics. The end of the period is set to the day that marked the end of the UN mandate as defined by Resolution 1743, about one and a half year after the elections. The reason for choosing that day was of a more practical nature: I wanted to stretch the period as close up to present time as possible, and hence optimise the foundation for the analysis of the strategies and reactions of various types in the post-electoral period. So Haiti during the period between the ousting of Aristide and the end of UN Resolution 1743 represents the case in this study.

However, this does not mean that everything that occurred before that period is categorically excluded from the analysis. Rather, this delimited period serves as a foundation for my choice of actors and the delimitation of their strategies. Data from the time prior to that period serve as background material in the analysis. The delimited time period is interesting in the context of my research questions for several reasons. First and foremost, the period is interesting because it covers the presidential and parliamentary elections of 2006. During the periods around elections, actors from different arenas tend to have focus on strategies – either in form of presentation and defence of their own strategies, as comments on the strategies of other actors, or as a combination of the two. Secondly, – and related to the first point – because of the

general scarcity of literature about Haiti, the choice of period is somewhat strategic in the sense that the general interest in a country usually increases in the period around elections.

### 1.3 Design: Single case study guided by theoretical propositions

“The great advantage of the case study”, argues Lijphart (1971:691) “is that by focusing on a single case, that case can be intensively examined even when the research resources at the investigator’s disposal are relatively limited.” As I argued above, my interest in the case Haiti is twofold: First of all, I became very fascinated by the country during my stay there in 2001-2002. Secondly, I find peace-building in the Haitian context very interesting because the conflict is not an outright civil war, but it has a tenacious grip on the Haitian society which seems hard to loosen. Given the quotation from Lijphart above, the case study method arguably is the ideal method for a study based on my motivations and objectives.

One disadvantage of the case study method, though, is that a single case cannot serve as foundation for generalising. According to Lijphart, that is problematic because generalisation is so central in scientific enterprise in general. However, case studies can serve to construct theories, or they can serve to collect data which can serve in further research (Lijphart 1971:691). This case study belongs to the second category, and because of the general lack of literature about Haiti, it arguably has the potential to make a contribution in that sense. Furthermore, it belongs to the group of *interpretative* case studies, because the analytical part of the study is guided by a theoretical framework. According to Andersen (2005:70), the role of theory in interpretative studies should be to organise empirical variations in a case. Therefore, concepts and theory should not be too general to be able to guide the empirical variations. In this thesis, the theoretical framework consists of three theoretical pillars, and each pillar leads to a hypothesis. It starts with a fairly general theory about conflict, and narrows down theory by theory, until it ends up with a specific

theory about peace-building in Haiti. In that manner, the theoretical framework is intended to cover as many aspects of the conflict as possible and contribute to a development of an understanding of the prerequisites for peace and the prospects for peace-building in Haiti.

## 1.4 The empirical foundations of the study

It goes without saying that intensive examination of an empirical case requires a solid base of empirical data. Yin (2003:13-14) focuses on two elements that are central in the data-collection process related to case studies: *multiple sources of evidence* and *data-triangulation*. As argued above, however, access to data is one of the great challenges in this study.

### 1.4.1 Multiple sources and triangulation

The thesis is based on documentation – such as various kinds of reports, UN-resolutions, newspaper articles and other articles – and interviews. Due to the very unstable situation in Haiti, it is unfortunately hard to plan any short fieldwork there, and therefore direct- and participant-observation are excluded as sources of evidence. However, personal experiences from my stay in the Haitian countryside undoubtedly have an impact on my *a priori* understanding of the situation. Gadamer (2003 [1953]:9) focuses on the societal and historical powers that condition our comprehension. As I will argue below, I believe I have an advantage in knowing the country, the culture and the mentality. On the other hand, I should be aware of potential problems related to the fact that my horizon and my understanding of the situation in Haiti certainly are coloured by my experiences. First, my interpretations of the different sources are probably influenced by prejudices I acquired during my stay there. Second, because I lived in the countryside, I am much more familiar with the reality of people in remote areas than in urban areas. In the context of this study, the second point is important because it is a quite common view that the differences between rural and urban areas represent a significant dividing line – and source of

conflict – in the Haitian society. A positive consequence of my stay there is that I know some Creole, but good knowledge of French is an even greater advantage I have in relation to this study because a great share of the literature concerning Haiti is in French.

There are many apprehensions of reality, and in particular because I focus on the strategies of different actors, it is important to take different views and interpretations into account. This is related to the criterion of data-triangulation. Again Gadamer (2003 [1953]:9) and history's effect upon the consciousness is relevant. Another advantage of using different sources of evidence is to supply other sources with information. The interview and the personal conversation, to which I return below, in particular have that function in this thesis. In the next subsection I discuss my secondary sources, before I turn to my primary sources in subsection 1.4.3, and comment on strengths and weaknesses related to my sources in subsection 1.4.4.

### **1.4.2 Secondary sources in an oral culture**

The thesis is primarily based on secondary sources. There exists a large literature concerning Haiti's history, but when it comes to the current situation, the literature available is fairly limited. Access to literature indeed is a great challenge for the work with this thesis. According to Haitian anthropologist Rachelle Doucet (2007 [personal conversation]), the scarcity of literature is in part due to Haiti's *oral* culture, in which the radio is the most important media. This is related to the high rate of illiteracy, and it is very common to see people listening to small pocket-radios in the street.

As noted above, Haiti receives relatively little attention in media and research, and that is another reason for the limited amount of literature. However, various Haitian media, such as *Alterpresse*, *Radio Kiskeya* and *Le Nouvelliste*, are useful sources of information. Also, in countries like France, the US and Canada, where there are large communities of Haitians, there is a particular interest in the country, and hence more literature available. The newspapers *Le Monde* and *The Miami Herald*, and the weekly updates from *Collectif Haïti de France*, *Une Semaine en Haïti*, are examples

of such sources. In addition, the UN, the International Crisis Group and the World Bank publish reports about the situation on a quite regular basis. The *Human Development Report* from the UNDP and the *CIA World Factbook* are useful sources for statistical data or more general facts, and Resolutions from the UNSC provide information about the strategies and actions of the UN. When it comes to Haitian official websites, they are in general very poor sources of information.

### **1.4.3 Primary sources: interviews by e-mail and personal conversation**

Telephone lines are in a deplorable state in Haiti, and they rarely function. Therefore it is convenient to get in touch with interviewees by e-mail. That is not to say that all Haitians have access to the Internet. In 2003, 4.8 % of the population had mobile phones, and 5.9 % used the Internet (UNDP 2006). Given the mentioned restrictions, and because I consider literature concerning the chosen international- and political actors to be sufficient, I limit my interviewees to the group of actors that receives the less attention in the literature, namely key-informants from civil society.

Jean Claude Cerin and Yannick Lahens – both central figures in the Group of 184 – are my interviewees from civil society. Cerin was the Executive Secretary of the group when the so-called New Social Contract – which is central in defining the strategy of the group – was proclaimed, and Lahens is responsible for the group today. I use qualitative, open-ended, unstructured interviews, so as to leave the interviewees as free as possible to give their own description. Too detailed and focused questions involve a risk of influencing the interviewees to answer in the direction they believe I want them to answer (Rubin and Rubin 2005:4). The interviews are *topical* – as opposed to *cultural* interviews. The aim of such interviews is to come up with a coherent explanation by gathering different peoples' ideas. However, since all individuals have their own history, it is important to keep in mind that each person might have his or her own construction of the events (Gadamer 2003 [1953]:9; Rubin and Rubin 2005:11).



Because the interviews are of an open-ended and unstructured nature, the border between interviews and personal conversation in this study is blurred. According to Rubin and Rubin (2005:110) the difference between *conversation* and *interview* lies in the researcher's guiding of the discussion in the interview. My discussion with Rachelle Doucet is an example of a conversation according to Rubin and Rubin's classification. Rachelle Doucet is an anthropologist from Haiti, and I met her in August 2007, while she was in Norway for work. Our conversation was a rather unstructured discussion about topics of general, current interest in Haiti as well as topics related to my project. She also answered many of my questions concerning issues that are not treated in the literature. According to Yin, such key informants are often critical to the success of a case study, but he warns against becoming too dependent on a key informant. Just like respondents, key informants have their own history and their own constructions of events, and relying on various sources of evidence is always an advantage (Gadamer 2003 [1953]:9; Yin 2003:90). The scarcity of literature – and the fact that Doucet is my only source for some of my data – is one of the great challenges of this thesis. The next subsection is about potential problems and advantages related to my sources and the design.

#### **1.4.4 Strengths and weaknesses of sources and design**

Over-reliance on documents might be a problem in case study research in general, and is indeed a potential source of problem for this thesis, which relies so heavily on literature review. Yin (2003:87) advises case study investigators to always bear in mind that all documents have a purpose or an intended audience, and the case study investigator – who is only an observer in that context – should try to detect the purposes and objectives of the documents.

When consulting Haitian sources – literature as well as informants or interviewees – knowledge about culture and mentality in Haiti arguably also is useful, and in that sense the fact that I have lived there is an advantage. In the introduction to his book

*Haiti's Predatory Republic*, Haitian Robert Fatton Jr. gives the following, rather negative description of the Haitian mentality:

The tragedy of Haiti's systemic foundation is that it literally eats the decency of humanity of perfectly honest men and women, transforming them into *grand mangeurs* (big eaters) (...) the immense poverty plaguing the country has generated a generalized pattern of callous indifference and a thoroughly *sauve-qui-peut* (every man for himself) attitude. (Fatton 2002:xi)

A popular saying goes as follows: *Depi nan Guiné nèg là ap bat lòt nèg*, meaning that since Guinea<sup>2</sup>, man beats man. In other words, the entire society appears to be permeated by the attitude described by Fatton. This predatory attitude leads to disillusionment and lack of trust in people high up in the hierarchy, and elites in general, among ordinary people. Not only are Haitians disillusioned, many refuse to discuss politics because the topic is associated with danger. People I got to know during my stay there told me they prefer to stay away from politics and live a life in peace rather than getting involved in dangerous business. Related to this is the fear of being sanctioned, which sometimes makes people prefer to alter the truth, so as to place themselves in a favourable light. In recent years there have been many attacks on the freedom of speech in Haiti. There are at least ten examples of unsolved cases of killings of Haitian journalists between 2000 and 2007 (International Freedom of Expression Exchange 2007).<sup>3</sup> These are important things to keep in mind when consulting the written sources but also in dialogue with Haitians.

## 1.5 The contribution of this thesis

What I seek to explore in this thesis is the prerequisites for peace in Haiti, and what a given set of actors do to build peace. However, as I argued above, my study might suffer from deficiencies in the empirical foundations, and besides, there are many

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<sup>2</sup> Guinea here means not only the geographical area, but the entire deportation of slaves when West-Africans were sold to the Europeans by their fellow citizens.

<sup>3</sup> A committee, which is independent from the government but recognised by president Préval, has been set down to oversee the investigation of those killings (International Freedom of Expression Exchange 2007).

comprehensions of reality. What the actors claim they are doing does not necessarily correspond with what they are doing in reality. With regard to those reservations, I can not guarantee that this thesis gives any clear and unambiguous answers to the research questions. Rather, the contribution of this thesis arguably is related to one of my motivations for writing it, namely the lack of literature concerning the ongoing conflict. Therefore, if this thesis can contribute to anything, it must be to give a plausible picture of the conflict in Haiti between February 2004 and October 2007, and the position of some of the actors involved in it.

## 1.6 Further outline

In this thesis I want to analyse what actors from the political scene, civil society and the international community do to contribute to a successful process of peace-building in Haiti. *Construct validity* concerns making sure that operational measures for the concepts of interest are correct (Yin 2003:34), and in relation to construct validity my definitions of the scope of the analysis and the concept of peace-building above are important. Chapter two addresses the criterion of construct validity more thoroughly. With awareness of the fact that a different choice of actors or a different delimitation of time would most probably lead to different results, I justify my choice of actors and the span of time chosen for the analysis, and give empirical background information to support my choices.

The theoretical framework is presented in chapter three. There are three different theories, and each of them leads to a hypothesis. The hypotheses provide a blueprint for the study as they help define the research design and procedures for data collection and serve as a guide through the analysis (Yin 2003:29). The theoretical framework is shaped like a funnel: it starts out very generally and narrows down theory by theory. All being related to the research questions and shedding light on different aspects of them, they are intended to cover as many aspects of the conflict during the delimited period of time, and – given the choice of actors – imaginable solutions to it, as possible. However, what I pointed out in relation to the validity of

my choice of actors and delimitation of time span also counts for the theoretical framework: a different selection of theories would possibly lead to different results.

In chapters four, five and six I test the hypotheses that are elaborated in chapter three. The first hypothesis – which is dealt with in chapter four – refers to Thomas Hobbes and concerns the *conflict*, and the supposition that lack of popular consent explains the conflict because popular consent is necessary for people to be united under democratic rule. In chapter five, I test Hypothesis 2, which is about *civil society*, and the assumption that an active civil society and social capital are vital for a peaceful solution in Haiti. Hypothesis 3 postulates that *dialogue* and *compromise* among the three chosen actors, added to an effective *institutional framework*, are necessary ingredients to a solution to the conflict. This third pillar is based on a combination of Roland Paris' so-called IBL-strategy (Institutionalisation Before Liberalisation) for peace-building after civil conflict, and Elizabeth Cousens and Chetan Kumar's recommendations for peace-building in Haiti, and it is dealt with in chapter six.

Finally, in chapter seven, I sum up the findings and the main arguments of the study.

## 2 Scope and delimitations

This chapter deals with necessary choices that are taken to delimit the scope of the analysis. The first part of the chapter deals with the time-period that I have chosen for the analysis, and the second deals with the actors. In addition to explaining the reasons for the choices, I give some empirical background material concerning the period and the actors.

The historical narrative in the first part does not give a detailed account that covers all aspects of Haitian history during the delimited time-period, and that is not the intention. Equally, the description of the actors in the second part is not supposed to say everything about them. Rather, those narratives are meant to provide background material for the analysis and a better understanding of my choices.

### 2.1 Context for analysis

February 2004 is a somewhat natural starting point for an analysis of prospects for peace-building in Haiti because former president Jean-Bertrand Aristide's departure marked the beginning of a new era in Haitian politics – for many associated with hope. The presidential and parliamentary elections in 2006 represent a very interesting moment in the context of this analysis. First and foremost because electoral campaigns per definition have a focus on objectives, choices and strategies, at least as far as political actors are concerned. In addition, elections tend to be critical moments in conflict-ridden societies like the Haitian one. For the understanding of the conflict and possible solutions, knowledge about the political climate, people's reactions, and the atmosphere around the elections is highly relevant. That is also the reason why the delimited time period does not end before one and a half years after the elections, the day when UN Resolution 1743 runs out.

Before I turn to the context for the analysis, I find it necessary to say a few words about Aristide and the background for his departure in February 2004. In the analyses

Aristide will be discussed thoroughly, with details on facts and controversies concerning his position in Haitian politics. Therefore the description of Aristide in this chapter – which deals with other actors and a time period during which Aristide was absent from the Haitian scene – will only contain what is strictly necessary for understanding the background for his departure. It is a superficial description of a complex phenomenon, which is very central in Haitian recent history.

### **2.1.1 Background: Aristide**

Jean-Bertrand Aristide, a catholic priest and defender of the rights of the poor, was elected president for the first time in 1990, in the first free and fair elections in Haitian history. He received 67.5% of the votes, and his victory represented a great hope for Haiti's poor. Aristide was also the man behind the movement *Lavalas*<sup>4</sup>, which was not a political party in the traditional sense, but a “semi-spontaneous loosely organised popular ‘civic uprising’ from within the civil society”, to use Robinson's words (Robinson 1996:284). In September 1991, after only nine months in power, Aristide was overthrown by a *coup*, which was carried through by the military leader Raoul Cédras, and supported by the Haitian elite (Kumar 2001:30-31).

Aristide spent most of his first term, from 1991 to 1994, in exile, while the country was governed by Cédras. In January 1993 Cédras accepted a proposal to establish a joint UN/OAS civilian human rights-monitoring mission in Haiti. The mission should have allowed Aristide's return in October 1993, but the *de facto* regime changed position, and eventually proved unwilling to comply with the agreement. The end of the story became the controversial UN Resolution 940 of July 1994, which included the term “all necessary means”, and authorised the formation of a multinational force under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (Kumar 2001:31-32).

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<sup>4</sup> *Lavalas* means 'the cleansing flood' in Creole.

New elections were held in 1995, but although he ran off with the victory once again, the Haitian constitution bans two consecutive presidential terms, so Aristide – reluctantly – had to pass the power to his chosen candidate René Préval. In 2000 Aristide – who had now created his own party – received 92% of the votes. Irregularities were observed during the elections, which made the international community as well as the opposition react vigorously. Aristide, however, did not take the reactions into consideration, and the situation grew more and more unstable until February 29 2004, when Aristide had to leave Haiti (International Crisis Group 2004:3-11).

### **2.1.2 February 29 2004-October 15 2007**

In accordance with the constitution Supreme Court President Boniface Alexandre was sworn in as Interim President immediately after Aristide's departure. The interim government was formed on March 17 (International Crisis Group 2004:11-12). Dupuy labels the interim government a 'cabinet of technocrats', consisting of individuals who had spent most of their lives outside Haiti, with "no expressed political aspirations beyond their service in the interim government..." (Dupuy 2005:191). The government adopted a scorched earth policy towards the *Lavalas*-supporters, so as to 'neutralise' *Lavalas*. In a short time, the human rights situation under the interim government turned out to be even worse than under Aristide's violent second term (Dupuy 2005:194-196). The UN Security Council considered that the situation in Haiti represented a threat to international peace and security in the region, and passed Resolution 1542 on April 30 2004. This implied establishment of the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), replacing the Multinational Interim Force (MIF), which had been authorised by the Security Council two months earlier (United Nations 2006).

Long-delayed first round presidential and parliamentary elections were finally held on February 7 2006. One week later, when 92% of the votes had been counted (including 4,3% blank votes and 7,4% invalid votes), the votes in favour of René

Préval – representing the platform *Lespwa*<sup>5</sup> represented almost 49% of the votes, and some of the other candidates – but not all – agreed that a second round would not be in Haiti’s best interest. The situation became rather tense when ballot papers and vote tallies were found at a garbage dump outside Port-au-Prince. After street protests and intervention by foreign diplomats, the Provisional Electoral Council decided to ignore the electoral law stipulating that blank votes should count as protest votes. Instead they chose to apply the so-called ‘Belgian formula’, which consists of distributing the blank votes proportionally among the candidates. Préval consequently received 51% of the votes, and was thus elected president without a second round. Préval was inaugurated on May 14 2006 (International Crisis Group 2006a:1, 4-5). According to the anthropologist Doucet (2007 [personal conversation]), *Lespwa* was created *ad hoc* just before the elections, and did not work out any official program. It is not a political party in the traditional sense, but an alliance of political parties and grassroots organisations that were all behind Préval’s candidature.<sup>6</sup>

Prime Minister Jacques-Edouard Alexis, also representing the *Lespwa* platform, took office on May 30 2006. The last elections for both chambers in the National Assembly were held on April 21 2006, and *Lespwa* turned out to receive the largest number of seats in both chambers: 11 seats in the Senate and 23 seats in the Chamber of Deputies (CIA 2007). Six parties are represented in Alexis’ government – several of them from Préval and Alexis’ platform *Lespwa*, and also representatives from five other parties, Aristide’s party *Fanmi Lavalas* included (Soukar 2007).

In October 2006 International Crisis Group characterised security as the core challenge facing Préval and the MINUSTAH:

Haiti’s five-month old government must confront the illegal armed gangs, break the international crime/political power at ports and borders and cope with rising drug trafficking and kidnapping. Armed gangs and criminals, including elements of the

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<sup>5</sup> *Lespwa* means ‘hope’ in Creole.

<sup>6</sup> The political parties ESKAMP and PLB, and the grassroots organisations Grand Anse Resistance Committee, the Central Plateau Peasants Group and Kombit Sudest make up the alliance *Lespwa* (CIA 2007).



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Haitian National Police (HNP)<sup>7</sup>, perpetrate the violence but it is also fostered by the worst poverty in the Western Hemisphere. (International Crisis Group 2006b:1)

Ten months later, in August 2007, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon visited Haiti. In the op-ed *Hope at Last for Haiti*, published on the MINUSTAH's websites after his visit, the Secretary-General gives, as the title indicates, an optimistic view of the progress made the last months. He relates some of the success to the MINUSTAH, and the fact that since around 800 gang members were arrested and their leaders put in prison, the number of kidnappings per month has decreased drastically. Whereas there were almost 100 kidnappings per month during the first months of 2007, the number had fallen to six in the month of June. In his op-ed, Ban also points to other signs of progress, such as the fact that Haiti now has a democratically elected, stable government that enjoys widespread accept within all social strata and by all political parties. The economy is yet another area that has seen progress, the Secretary-General argues – the inflation has decreased from 40% to 8% during the last three years (Ban 2007b).

In The Miami Herald on August 26 2007, senior vice president of the International Crisis Group, Mark L. Schneider, gave a similar, optimistic view of the situation in Haiti:

When I visited Cite Soleil a year ago, I travelled in a U.N. peacekeeping personnel carrier and wore a blue bullet-proof vest and helmet (...) Last week, I walked through the impoverished slum of 250,000 wearing a T-shirt and khakis, with no security, and chatted with local elected leaders and workers building roads, drains and basketball courts. Haiti has begun to build peace. (Schneider 2007)

Although progress can be observed, however, Schneider (2007) also points to the fact that there still is a job to do in Haiti: MINUSTAH's arresting of gang-members definitely is a positive step, but there are problems related to it in a dysfunctional justice system with already overcrowded prisons. Drugs-trafficking is still a widespread problem in Haiti, and it encourages corruption and criminality. When it

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<sup>7</sup> The Director General of HNP since July 2005, Mario Andrésol, has declared 25% of the force to be corrupt (International Crisis Group 2006b:7). In February 2006 Clarens Renois (2006) reported that there were about 5 000 police officers for a population of 8,5 million.

comes to politics and the relationship between the legislative and the executive, the potential for instability is never far away, according to Schneider. He points to an episode where the minister of culture and one of the president's closest collaborators, Daniel Elie, was dismissed by the Chamber of Deputies. The official reason for the act of censure was related to the distribution of the budget reserved for the carnival, but according to certain deputies that voted against it, the real motives behind the vote were personal. Préval answered to the dismissal by calling in central members of Parliament to make a budget compromise (Collectif Haïti de France 2007f; Schneider 2007). Such an episode, argues Schneider (2007), could have a destabilising effect, even to the point of bloodshed, if it weren't for Préval's compromising reaction to it.

"Haiti has begun to build peace", argues Schneider (2007). It seems like considerable progress was made between February 2004 and October 2007, although there still is a way to go to. In this thesis I am going to analyse the role of a selected set of actors in the peace-building process between February 2004 and October 2007. The actors arguably are of great importance for the peace-building process. Who are those actors, and why are they relevant in such an analysis?

## 2.2 Choice of actors

### 2.2.1 The UN in Haiti

The UN represents the international community in this study. The international community has traditionally been heavily involved in Haiti, and the 1990s were especially marked by such engagement. In particular the US has been deeply engaged in peace-building efforts in Haiti. Important reasons for US-involvement have been concerns about regional instability and especially the flows of boat-people entering the country whenever the situation in Haiti deteriorates. However, in this analysis, the UN represents the international community because of the strengthened mandate during the 2006 presidential elections and the organisations' heavy involvement in Haiti during the entire period that represents the context for analysis. In addition, its

strategies arguably are more interesting in the sense that they are representative of more aspects of the international community than the unilateral interests of the US.

The UN has been engaged in a great number of activities in Haiti since the 1990s.<sup>8</sup> Those activities included election monitoring in 1990, UN Security Council mandated sanctions and a naval blockade in 1993-4, UN Security Council-authorized use of force in 1994 in order to restore Aristide after his exile during Cédras' regime, and an important peacekeeping operation in 1994-6 (Von Einsiedel and Malone 2006).

When it comes to the activities during the period from February 2004 to October 2007, a UN Security Council authorisation of a 3000-strong Multinational Interim Force (MIF) was installed immediately after Aristide's departure on 29 February 2004 (Von Einsiedel and Malone 2006). In April 2004 the MIF was replaced by the MINUSTAH, and the last mandate of interest in this study, from February 2007, ran out on October 15 2007 (United Nations Security Council 2004b; United Nations Security Council 2007). Three persons have held the position as chief of the MINUSTAH and Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Haiti: Juan Gabriel Valdes, Edmond Mulet and, since September 1 2007, Hédi Annabi (Collectif Haïti de France 2007g).

Although many international actors have been heavily involved in Haiti in recent times, arguably none was present to the same extent as the UN during the period from February 2004 to October 2007. In addition, the organisation is directly involved in peace-building, whereas other international actors are engaged in other fields that do

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<sup>8</sup> However, this is not to say that the UN is the only multilateral actor present in Haiti. In particular the Organisation of American States (OAS) is, and has been, heavily involved. For instance, the organisation has an important project on the modernisation of the Haitian civil state going on, which is planned to last for the next two years (Collectif Haïti de France 2007b). International financial institutions have also, since 2004, through the Interim Cooperation Framework, assisted in designing economic reforms. The government follows up with a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, which is supposed to be completed this year (International Crisis Group 2007b:14). Haiti is now a member of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), which obliges Haiti to bring customs control and –regulatory framework to international standards, which is undoubtedly a positive step in the direction of fighting criminality as well as collection of taxes (International Crisis Group 2007b:15). These are only a few examples of a vast number of international actors of various kinds that are involved in Haiti.

not to the same extent concern this study. According to Von Einsiedel and Malone (2006:160), the UN's efforts in Haiti have traditionally been undermined by an unhelpful and unreliable attitude, in particular from Aristide's part, but also from other Haitian actors. This, they contend, reflects the country's 'winner-takes-all' political culture. The Haitian support for presence of international actors in general also seemed to fall from the 1990s to 2006 (Von Einsiedel and Malone 2006: 165).

Rachelle Doucet (2007 [personal conversation]) points to the composition of the MINUSTAH, the number of nationalities represented in the forces, and lack of knowledge about Haitian culture and incapability of communicating in Creole and French as reasons for the unpopularity. Fourteen countries – Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Guatemala, Jordan, Nepal, Paraguay, Peru, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Uruguay and the US – participate with military personnel. None of those countries have French as official language. The civil police force is composed of agents from 36 different countries. Fourteen of those countries are francophone, namely Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroun, Canada, Chad, France, Guinea, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritius, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal and Togo. In Mauritius 80.5% of the population even speaks a Creole that is quite similar to the one spoken in Haiti. However, the remaining twenty-two of the countries represented in the civil police force are not francophone: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Egypt, El Salvador, Grenada, Jordan, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Romania, Russia, Sierra Leone, Spain, Turkey, Uruguay, the US, Vanuatu and Yemen (CIA 2007, United Nations 2007).

Lack of geo-strategic importance is also a problem for Haiti, especially in relation to the donors, and thus the aid predictability. Compared to geo-strategically more significant states, like for instance Afghanistan, Iraq or Israel/Palestine, Haiti is much more vulnerable and exposed to changes in donor priorities (Von Einsiedel and Malone 2006:167). In chapter four, five and six I will analyse the efforts and intentions of the UN and two central Haitian actors between 2004 and 2007, and whether their strategies converged at any points during that period. One of those

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central Haitian actors is president Préval, and the next subsection deals with him and the political system.

### **2.2.2 The president and the political system**

President Préval is the actor that represents the political arena in this analysis. As will be argued below, the Haitian president is constitutionally weak when he is not from the same party as the prime minister. However, that is not the case today, since President Préval and Prime Minister Alexis represent the same *Lespwa* platform. Besides, Préval was elected directly by the people, whereas Alexis was handpicked by Préval, and Alexis has based his plan for the government on Préval's ideas. In other words, there is good reason to let Préval represent the political arena in the analysis. To get an understanding of the power and the position of the president, as well as potential sources of conflict, some knowledge of details in the Haitian constitution is necessary.

The Haitian president is elected by popular vote for a five-year term and can serve maximum two terms, but there must be at least five years in-between. In other words, the president cannot serve consecutive terms (CIA 2007, Katz 2007). Linz (1994:12, 17) emphasises problems related to 'no re-election': First, a president who cannot be presented for re-election can hardly be held accountable. Secondly – and consequently – 'no re-election' might lead to ill-designed politics and rapid implementation, which might again lead to political tension and inefficiency.

The prime minister is appointed by the president and ratified by the National Assembly (*Assemblée Nationale*). The rest of the ministers are chosen by the prime minister, in consultation with the president. The National Assembly has two chambers: the Senate has 30 seats, and its members are elected by popular vote for six-year terms, one third is elected every second year. The Chamber of Deputies has 99 seats, and its members are elected by popular vote for four-year terms (CIA 2007).

In their book *Presidents and Assemblies. Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics*, Shugart and Carey (1992:160,162) classify regimes into *president-parliamentary*, *presidential*, *premier-presidential*, *assembly-independent* and *parliamentary*. Because of the National Assembly's censure of the executive in the Haitian system, and the president's lack of authority over the government and inability to dissolve parliament, they classify Haiti – along with Bulgaria and Ireland – as a *parliamentary* regime.

Shugart and Carey (1992:72-73) underscore three particularities with the Haitian constitution of 1987: First, the cabinet relies exclusively on parliamentary confidence.<sup>9</sup> Second, measures are taken to avoid crises over the appointment of the prime minister and the relations between prime minister and president: The president must propose a member of the majority party in the National Assembly as prime minister. When no party has majority, the president must first consult with the presidents of both chambers, meaning that in that case the National Assembly has primacy in the makeup of the government, and the president thus becomes virtually powerless. Third, there is a requirement for simultaneous confidence in the cabinet by both chambers. However, the majorities of the two chambers might differ, since the chambers are constituted differently. This feature can be a potential source of conflict and constitutional crisis.

In other words, the president is relatively powerless in the Haitian constitution. However, in his *declaration de politique générale* in June 2006, Prime Minister Alexis stated that he would base the actions of his government on two important orientations defined by Préval:

...on the one hand, construction of the modern State and strengthening of democratic institutions, and on the other hand creation of favourable conditions for investment regarding creation of wealth for the benefit of the entire population (Radio Kiskeya 2006:2, my translation).

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<sup>9</sup> In the section about the context for analysis above I commented on the Chamber of Deputies' dismissal of the minister of culture. That episode illustrates to what extent the Parliament is powerful in the Haitian constitution.

The *politique générale* of Alexis was ratified unanimously by the parliament (République d'Haïti 2006:6). The president and the prime minister belong to the same political platform, and the latter is handpicked by the former. In addition, the president's definition of political orientations for the government is taken into account by the prime minister and ratified unanimously by the parliament. All of this together definitely increases the power and influence of the president. With regard to the constitutional particularities outlined by Shugart and Carey, the fact that Préval's *Lespwa* platform has the largest number of seats in both chambers of the National Assembly undoubtedly is an advantage as far as stability is concerned. However, it would have been much more stable if *Lespwa* had majority in the two chambers.

All in all Préval – although constitutionally weak – arguably is the most interesting political actor in this context. -First and foremost because he is the architect behind the political guidelines for the government, but also because he is the leader of *Lespwa*, which is the party, or platform, with the greatest number of seats in both chambers of parliament. In addition, Préval is elected directly by the people, a feature which gives him power to affect policies – as opposed to presidents who are nominated by the parliament, who play more symbolic roles (Linz 1994:48-49).

### **2.2.3 Haiti's civil society and the Group of 184**

The Group of 184 represents civil society in this study. In the theoretical framework I will discuss why civil society should play a role in this analysis. Suffice it to say here that I refer to Paris, who defines civil society as “the space or arena between the household and the state in which citizens engage in organised activities that are not governmental in nature, but nevertheless ‘public’” (Paris 2004:156). In the book *Haiti – State against Nation*, Michel-Rolph Trouillot (1990) argues that the Duvalierist state<sup>10</sup> was the result of an increasing gap between the political and the

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<sup>10</sup> The *Duvalierist state* refers to the authoritarian regime of François and Jean-Claude Duvalier that lasted from 1957 to 1986.

civil society in Haiti, and that understanding the state “requires an examination of the relationship between state and civil society” (Trouillot 1990:18).

The reason why the Group of 184 is the chosen actor from civil society is that it represents a large spectre of the Haitian civil society. In addition it has – contrary to many Haitian so-called Popular Organisations (*Organisations Populaires*) – managed to stick to its civil society profile. I will return to the particularities of Haitian Popular Organisations in chapter five.

The Group of 184 is an umbrella organisation covering many different organisations and initiatives, which makes it representative for a large spectre of the Haitian civil society. It started out as a coalition of 184 civic and grassroots organisations, but more than 200 organisations have joined the group since the start. It emerged between 2000 and 2004, led by André Apaid, a wealthy businessman (International Crisis Group 2004:9). In the declaration of the creation of Group of 184 from December 2002, 14 different sectors, movements and professions are mentioned: the syndicate movement; the private business-sector; the farmers’ sector; the civic sector; the sector of the socio-professionals; the teachers’ sector; the sector of media and press; the students’ sector; the intellectuals’ sector; the sector of writers and artists; the popular urban sector; women’s associations’ sector; the sector of human rights; and the medical profession (Alterpresse 2002).

According to Pierre (2006:7), the members are the ones “disappointed by Aristide” – they indeed belong to different sectors and different private interests, but they have their hostility against Aristide and *Lavalas* in common. The group played a leading role in the ousting of Aristide in February 2004, and it has been described as a representative of the interests of the elite (Dupuy 2006:132; International Crisis Group 2006a:3), whereas Aristide and *Lavalas* claimed to represent the poor. According to Doucet (2007 [personal conversation]), however, the Group of 184 is very representative of the entire Haitian society – first because so many different



organisations, associations and initiatives – from different sectors – are represented. Second, the Group has based its agenda on a campaign called *Caravane de l'espoir*<sup>11</sup>. The aim of the campaign was twofold: On the one hand the objective was to make people understand the necessity of putting an end to the political crisis, and on the other hand it sought to gather opinions and create consensus around a New Social Contract (*Nouveau Contrat Social*). This was done through discussions with people from all sectors of life in Port-au-Prince, other Haitian towns and places abroad with communities of Haitians. The Contract was published on November 13 2005 (Collectif Haïti de France 2005; Lahens 2007 [e-mail]).

In particular, Group of 184's role as spearhead in the anti-*Lavalas* campaign from 2003 to 2004 makes it an interesting actor.<sup>12</sup> Therefore, and because of the role as a representative of a large spectre of Haitian civil society, in particular due to the *Caravane de l'espoir*, the group will represent civil society in this analysis.

## 2.3 Conclusion

This chapter has served two purposes. First of all it has explained why I have chosen to delimit the time span and selection of actors the way I have. The choice of time-period was above all grounded in an interest in the presidential and parliamentary elections of 2006. Because Aristide has been a very central figure in Haitian politics for a long time, and questions over his person indeed influenced the electoral campaign, I found that his departure on February 29 2004 was a natural starting point. The political climate after the elections as well arguably is very interesting for the purpose of this study. Therefore the period lasts until October 15 2007, when UN Resolution 1743 ran out. When it comes to the choice of actors, it was founded on two criteria: first, the research question focuses on *the political scene, civil society*

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<sup>11</sup> *Caravane de l'espoir* means 'caravan of hope' in French.

<sup>12</sup>Paradoxically, in a somewhat similar way Aristide's *Lavalas*-movement was a central actor in the period following Jean-Claude Duvalier's departure in 1986.

and *the international community*, so the actors inevitably had to be chosen from those areas. Second, all the chosen actors – the UN, President Préval and the Group of 184 – played important roles on the Haitian scene during the delimited time period.

The second purpose this chapter has served is to give a brief account of the Haitian scenario between February 29 2004 and October 15 2007, and to introduce the actors, so as to provide a better understanding of the choices, and background material for the analysis. In the next chapter I will present the theoretical framework, before I turn to the analyses in chapter four, five and six.

### 3 Theoretical framework

This chapter is divided into three sections, which are all related to prerequisites for peace and/or peace-building. The chapter narrows in from conflicts in general to very specific theories on peace-building in Haiti. Each section is related to a hypothesis, and the different hypotheses are linked to one another. They will be tested in the analyses. By structuring the analysis around different theories, I attempt to cover different aspects of the Haitian conflict and imaginable solutions, in order to get closer to an answer to the research questions.

According to Paris (2004:47) the earliest writers on the Liberal Peace Thesis, such as Hobbes and Locke, paid more attention to challenges facing peace-building in our era than today's scholars do. Their starting point was rational actors in the *State of nature*, and the idea that domestic peace is dependent on governmental institutions that are able to defend society against external as well as internal threats. The idea of a State of nature seems highly relevant in a society like Haiti, where the problem has been exactly that governmental institutions are too weak to defend society against external as well as internal threats. The problem is intimately related to another problem: that of division and lack of popular consent.

#### 3.1 A State of nature

People are – according to Hobbes' (1998 [1642]) perspective – motivated by egoistic goals, and left to themselves they will inevitably come into conflict. He regards society as a mixture of selfishness, violence and fear, and doubts that it will ever be possible for human beings to act altruistically. The natural form of society is for Hobbes not an organised one, but what he labels the State of nature. Driven by egoism, individuals will, according to this perspective, seek peace only in order to protect their own life, and there is a war of every man against every man. "Laws are silent among arms", Hobbes (1998 [1642]:69) argues, and the only possible way to

avoid conflict is to enter what he calls Union. Hobbes writes the following about the passage from State of nature to Union:

This *submission* of all their wills to the *will of one man* or of *one Assembly* comes about, when each of them obligates himself, by an Agreement with each of the rest, (...) not to withhold the use of his wealth and strength against any other men than himself... (Hobbes 1998 [1642]:72, emphasis in original)

The Assembly's will is to be understood as the will of the majority of those who make up the Assembly (Hobbes 1998 [1642]:72). In order to be able to keep peace among themselves and to protect themselves against outsiders, Hobbes (1998 [1642]:78) argues, the citizens need to unite their strength – in the Sovereign power:

...for the only one who can rightly compel the citizens to arms (...) is the one who has the right to punish anyone who disobeys. Both swords, therefore, the *Sword of war* and the *Sword of justice* are inherent in sovereign power (...) It is the responsibility of the same *Sovereign power* to come up with rules or measures that will be common to all, and to publish them openly... (Hobbes 1998 [1642]:79, emphasis in original)

Continuing Hobbes' theory of a state of nature, Locke sees this state as one with two faces: Originally a cooperative and benign one, not so different from Aristotle's ideal society where people – acting rationally – are assumed to be naturally inclined to organise themselves in societies. However, as soon as an individual or a group seeks power over other individuals, it will turn into a state of war, and the individuals will be entitled to use any means to regain their freedom. Locke also imagines a sort of 'social contract' between the ruler and the people, by which people join voluntarily as one society, and hence give up their natural rights when it comes to making laws. An important aspect of Locke's argument, though, is that absolute power without independent judges makes the ruled remain in a state of nature. He does not suggest any particular form of government as ideal, as long as it is based upon separation of powers and popular consent (Cohen 2000:73-74). Separation of powers and popular consent are central ingredients in a democratic society.

Hypothesis 1: *The conflict in Haiti is due to absence of the popular consent that is required to unite the people under a democratically elected sovereign.*

In his article *The Prosperous Community* Robert Putnam (1993) asks how dilemmas of collective action can be dealt with without the presence of a Hobbesian sovereign. "Residents of American ghettos share an interest in safer streets, but collective action to control crime fails", Putnam (1993:1) exemplifies. He finds his answer in the concept of *social capital*.

Putnam (1993:2) underscores the importance of social capital in relation to problems of collective action. The section about peace-building later in this chapter emphasises the crucial role of civil society in peace-building enterprises. In addition to being traditionally weak in Haiti, yet crucial to peace-building and cooperation, there exist a whole range of theories about the concept of civil society. Those three factors together make civil society worth a discussion.

### 3.2 Civil society and social capital

There exists a wide range of approaches to- and theories about the concept of civil society. In his book *At War's End*, Roland Paris (2004:156) defines civil society as "the space or arena between the household and the state in which citizens engage in organised activities that are not governmental in nature, but nevertheless 'public'". He mentions two important functions of civil society in liberal democracies: First, it serves as a counterbalance to the state power, and second, it helps to teach citizens habits of compromise and negotiation necessary for democracy to be successful. In addition, Paris (2004:156) argues, a more recent function exists, namely the fact that being member of different associations at the same time results in overlapping commitment to various social groups, or 'cross-cutting cleavages'. This makes the occurrence of single lines of conflict less likely.

Putnam (1993:2) uses the term *social capital* to cover social organisations "such as networks, norms, trust, that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit." This is intimately related to the concept of civil society. Social capital, Putnam argues, "enhances the benefits of investment in physical and human capital."

He refers to Alexis de Tocqueville, who associated strong traditions of civic engagement with successful democracy.

According to Jean Grugel (2002:94), resources, knowledge, recognition and self-esteem are necessary for participating in civil society organisations. To act as a force of change in relation to the state is, according to Grugel (2002:95), civil society's primary role as far as democracy is concerned. However – partly due to difficulties related to establishing democratic mechanisms for representation of civil society organisations in democracies – new democracies do not channel or represent civil society groups in an adequate manner. “A strong civil society matters because it helps determine the *quality* of democracy”, she contends, “Civil society organizations are not an alternative to other forms of political representation; they are a means for checking and controlling the state and a tool to push the state towards deeper reforms” (Grugel 2002:115).

Fatton contends that absorption of all social strata – in civil society as well as the political society – is crucial for Haiti's prospects for a democratic future:

Unless civil society can generate, especially ‘from below’, an effective political society, extrication from dictatorial rule can easily degenerate into a process of ‘redictatorialization’ (...) Should subordinate classes fail to create their own political organizations, the balance of power will inevitably favour predatory rulers and middle sectors whose commitment to democracy is always ambiguous and tenuous. (Fatton 1999:218-219)

*Hypothesis 2: Social capital and a strong civil society are necessary ingredients in a solution to the conflict in Haiti.*

It does seem probable that a strong civil society and social capital are important for dialogue and cooperation in all societies, and in particular in conflict-ridden societies like Haiti. But what else is needed to build peace? The next section is about peace-building – first in a general perspective, and then in relation to the Haitian case in particular.

### 3.3 Peace-building

In the article *Broadening the Study of Peace Operations* Paris (2000:29-30) divides the literature on peace operations between ‘micro’ approaches and ‘macro’ approaches. The former, he argues, focus on *design, conduct* and *outcome* of peace operations, and can be useful for identifying circumstances in which such operations are likely to succeed, and those where they are not. The latter, which according to Paris is an understudied area, can provide help in understanding the *broader implications* of peace operations and of those operations as *products of the international system*. Paris’ book represents the ‘macro’ approach to peace-building.

#### 3.3.1 A ‘macro’ approach to peace-building: the IBL-strategy

Paris’ book *At War’s End* assesses eleven cases of more or less successful peace-building activities. Common for all the eleven cases is that they are states emerging from a civil war. In this thesis it will be natural to consider Paris’ findings in relation to the Haitian case. Haiti, however, is not emerging from a civil war, and is hence not one of Paris’ eleven cases. Nevertheless Haiti has one important feature in common with the cases in *At War’s End*, in that the country has been ravaged by conflict for years. In that respect, the notion ‘post-conflict society’ is a common denominator here.

Paris (2004:5-6) criticises what he labels the *Liberal Peace Thesis*, which was dominant in peace-building enterprises during the 1990s. The central belief in the *Liberal Peace Thesis* is that promoting liberalisation – in the political as well as the economic realm – will necessarily lead to conditions for stable, lasting peace. According to Paris, the strategy seems to have increased rather than reduced the likelihood of renewal of violence in some of the states.

Instead, Paris proposes the *Institutionalisation Before Liberalisation* (IBL) strategy. So as to reach political stability and to establish effective administration over the territory, the IBL-approach recommends peace-builders to concentrate on building a

framework of effective institutions *before* promoting political and economic competition. Paris lists six key elements of the IBL strategy:

1. Wait until conditions are ripe for elections
2. Design electoral systems that reward moderation
3. Promote good civil society
4. Control hate speech
5. Adopt conflict-reducing economic policies
6. The common denominator: rebuild effective state institutions

(Paris 2004:188)

In the analysis in chapter six I will focus on points one, two, four, five and six, and whether the chosen actors do – or intend to do – anything in relation to them. Point three will be discussed in relation to Hypothesis 2. Paris (2004:159) admits that capitalism and democracy have conflict-dampening qualities in the sense that competition founded on self-interest contributes to organise society. However, he argues, if conflicts become so intense that the institutional framework can not channel them effectively, democracy and capitalism are not sufficient. In relation to the sixth key element of the IBL-strategy I will focus on institutions in the justice and corrections sectors, because – as was indicated in chapter two – they do not seem to channel the conflict efficiently.

That leads me to Paris' next argument, namely that peace-building enterprises need to be tailored in order to fit the states they are supposed to suit. In that relation it is important for peace-builders to bear in mind that societies that need peace-building are vulnerable in several ways: First, strong social conflicts are already in place when the liberalisation process begins – otherwise there would not be any need for peace-building. Second, there typically is a lack of tradition for peaceful dispute resolution and 'conflict dampeners'. Third, effective governmental institutions – that could have helped to contain and manage what Paris calls 'the pathologies of liberalisation' – are absent (Paris 2004:168-175). Although Paris promotes the 'macro'-approach to



peace-building, he does recognise the need for ‘policy-relevant research’, or a ‘micro’-approach, in the domain of peace-building (Paris 2000:44). Chetan Kumar and Elizabeth Cousens are two authors with a policy-relevant approach to peace-building in Haiti. In an analysis of peace-building efforts in Haiti I find it fruitful to combine the two approaches.

### **3.3.2 A ‘micro’ approach: recommendations for peace-building in Haiti**

In the introduction to the book *Peacebuilding as Politics. Cultivating Peace in Fragile Societies*, edited by Chetan Kumar and Elizabeth M. Cousens, Cousens (2001:12) argues – in accordance with Paris – that the aim of peace-building is to develop effective mechanisms for conflict resolution. The aim is not, she contends, to eliminate conflict completely, as conflicts occur in all societies, and again it is relevant to refer to the quotation at the outset of chapter one above: “The objective of peacebuilding (...) retains a focus on violent conflict (the central concern when peace is defined as the absence of war) but with an interest in the tools a society can develop to manage such conflict authoritatively and legitimately...” (Cousens 2001:13).

Chapter two of the book is about Haiti specifically. Kumar, who is the author of that chapter, outlines three recommendations for peace-building in Haiti: First, he argues, specific international initiatives should be accompanied by *broad-based dialogue*, with focus on interests in the long run that are common to different sectors of society. It would be of great importance, however, to emphasise the time aspect, so that those likely to lose in the short term would get guarantees of long-term gains. Those likely to win in the short term would have to be persuaded that the long-term gains would be even greater if they avoided trying to appropriate the entire initiative immediately. According to Kumar, Haitians tend to be pragmatic people, and such a process of identification of common interests is likely to develop rapidly among pragmatic persons (Kumar 2001:42-44).

Second, dialogue among different sectors and promotion of processes leading to long-term goals would create a *national exercise in compromise*. Such an exercise at national level would inspire similar dialogues at the local level. It would be a great step forward if national and local political and civic leaders from all sectors were brought together, so as to learn about one another's interests, and then create common agendas based on those interests (Kumar 2001:44).

Third, efforts should be made to assist the development of a *civil society*. A strong civil society would play a crucial role in making the political system more responsive and accountable to Haitians (Kumar 2001:44). As noted above, civil society's role in peace-building will be discussed in relation to Hypothesis 2.

In an IPA -paper comparing international efforts to encourage and sustain peace in Guatemala and Haiti, Chetan Kumar and Sara Lodge (2002) put forward arguments similar to those outlined above: Existence of democratic institutions alone do not guarantee that the political process in a country is able to engage and deal with disagreement. If there is no broad consensus on how to reach peaceful change and no framework for forms of dialogue and decision-making other than elections and referenda, they argue, those tools of democratic participation may even have a divisive effect. In line with those arguments my focus lies on dialogue and compromise among actors as well as on institutions.

### **3.3.3 Summing up the theoretical core**

Together the approaches to peace-building presented above constitute the core of the theoretical framework of this paper. In my opinion Paris' IBL-strategy and Kumar's recommendations for peace-building complement each other, rather than compete, and Hypothesis 3 combines the two approaches. It focuses on three different variables that are assumed to have an impact on peace-building: broad-based dialogue, compromise among actors from different sectors and an effective institutional framework.

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Hypothesis 3: *If there is broad-based dialogue and compromise among actors from the political society, the international community and civil society, in addition to an effective institutional framework, one can assume that a peace-building process is on its way in Haiti*

As to the first variable – *broad-based dialogue* – Kumar underscores the importance of the time aspect and different sectors. Hence, the concept of *broad-based dialogue* is understood here as a dialogue that focuses on long-term interests and includes different sectors of society. The second, and related, variable concerns *compromise among actors from political society, the international community and civil society*. In relation to this second variable, Kumar focuses on advantages of bringing together local political and civil leaders from different sectors for an exchange of interests and strategies and creation of a common agenda. In my evaluation of the Haitian peace-building process, I will therefore focus on the time-perspective of efforts and initiatives, and to what extent the three actors I have chosen for the analysis recognise the role of other sectors than their own in a peace-building process.

The third aspect – an effective institutional framework – is central in Paris' approach to peace-building, and the criterion for an effective institutional framework in this analysis is understood as one that follows Paris' six key elements of the IBL-strategy. As argued above, civil society will be discussed in relation to Hypothesis 2, and hence not in relation to Hypothesis 3. When it comes to Paris' sixth element, I will focus on institutions in the justice and corrections sectors.

### 3.4 Conclusion

In this chapter I have presented the theoretical framework for the study. The framework is constructed around three main pillars, which all concern conflicts in one way or another. It started out with a fairly general theory about conflict-ridden societies in general, namely Hobbes' *State of nature*. The second pillar concerned civil society and social capital, and emphasis was put on the role of civil society in

conflicts. Finally, in the third part, the core of the theoretical framework was presented, namely a combination of different theories concerning peace-building.

Each of the three pillars is related to a hypothesis, and the hypotheses serve as a guide for the analysis, which is presented in the next three chapters.

## 4 Analysis 1

Hypothesis 1: *The conflict in Haiti is due to absence of the popular consent that is required to unite the people under a democratically elected sovereign*

Hobbes calls the passage whereby the population submits its will to the will of one man, or an Assembly, the passage from *State of nature* to *Union*. The will of the Assembly is to be understood as the will of the majority of those making up the Assembly. In the continuation of Hobbes' ideas, Locke underscores the importance of a government based upon separation of powers and popular consent.

The Haitian president is directly elected by the people, and can be considered to be the Hobbesian sovereign in the Haitian context. Is lack of support for the sovereign the problem in Haiti? In this discussion it is necessary to go back in history, to the years with Aristide in power. As the first democratically elected president in Haitian history, Aristide has had a significant impact on the legitimacy of the Haitian presidency in general. Therefore, the years under Aristide represent an important point of departure for understanding the position of the selected actors between February 2004 and October 2007 regarding questions over the sovereign. Based on knowledge about the chosen actors' support for Aristide and Préval respectively, I will discuss whether or not the conflict in Haiti seems to be related to their lack of legitimacy. The discussion will also touch upon other factors which apparently play a role in the conflict, namely the violent gangs and Haiti's frail institutional framework.

### 4.1 The Haitian presidency – the Hobbesian sovereign – and controversies over Aristide

In 1990 the Catholic priest Jean-Bertrand Aristide was elected president in Haitian history's first free and fair elections. He led a combat against the old, elite-favouring system and for the interests of the poor, who attached great hope to his mandate. However, only nine months after his inauguration, Aristide was removed from power

by a *coup d'état*, led by General Raoul Cédras. Cédras' extremely violent regime lasted for three years, during which Aristide was in exile in the US (International Crisis Group 2004:3-4). In October 1994 Aristide returned to Haiti, and renounced the clergy (Broussard 2002). According to Kumar (1998:68), he adopted a *dual persona* during his exile, presenting himself as a liberal democrat in English and French and railing against imperialism and the bourgeoisie in Creole. In an article in the French newspaper *Le Monde*, Philippe Broussard in 2002 wrote about former friends and allies of Aristide who were disappointed by the way the popular 'father from the slum' developed. The founder of the Creole newspaper *Jounal Libète*, Jean-Yves Urfié, used to be close to Aristide: "...it's the emptiness of his thoughts that disappoints me. The last time I wanted to interview him, in 1997, it was an intellectual catastrophe. He had no ideas concerning Haiti. His obsession apparently was to stay in power" (Broussard 2002, my translation).

New elections were held in 1995, and a pro-Aristide coalition, *Bò Tab la*, led by the OPL (*Organisation Politique Lavalas*), ran off with the victory. Because the Haitian constitution follows the principle of 'no re-election' for the president, Aristide had to hand the power over to his hand-picked candidate René Préval. Préval had exercised as president for less than a year when fractions occurred within the Lavalas-coalition<sup>13</sup>, and Aristide created his own party, *Fanmi Lavalas*. This led to political crisis and rupture of the alliance between Préval and Aristide. In June 1997 – after increasing pressure from Aristide – prime minister Rosny Smarth resigned. Préval proposed two different successors – both rejected by the legislature – before Jacques Edouard Alexis was confirmed as prime minister in December 1998. This internal crisis weakened the authority of the state and strengthened public disillusionment (International Crisis Group 2004:4-6).

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<sup>13</sup> Apparently Aristide was particularly disappointed because the Préval government – and not himself – was treated as the 'legitimate' power by the international community (International Crisis Group 2004:5).

The elections of 2000 were won by Aristide and *Fanmi Lavalas*, receiving 92% of the votes. Irregularities such as manipulation of ballots and a flawed method to calculate votes for the Senate in the first round resulted in *Fanmi Lavalas*-candidates wrongfully winning the first round in half the contests. The international community demanded the Provisional Electoral Council to correct the flawed method, menacing to discredit the entire election. The council refused, and the second round consequently had to take place in the absence of the OAS-observers. Equally, all opposition parties of any importance boycotted the second round and demanded annulment of the first round (International Crisis Group 2004:7-8).

Questions about the Parliament's legitimacy and the stagnation of the institution-building process thus made important donors block US\$ 500 million in direct assistance as well as support for reforms. In spite of the obvious irregularities during the elections, Aristide seemingly believed the people still was behind him, and showed no interest in dialogue with the opposition. However, the support for Aristide was no longer as strong as it had been in 1994, and a political crisis followed the elections of 2000. From late 2002 to early 2003 violent attacks on opposition groups by government-supporting gangs became more and more frequent. Through the summer and autumn 2003, the political situation became increasingly unstable, and it reached a peak with an armed insurgency of February 2004 (International Crisis Group 2004:8-9).

According to Dupuy (2005:187, 193), Aristide eventually became the victim of his own politics. The armed rebellion against him was started by Butteur Métayer, a *Chimère* leader and member of the pro-Aristide gang called the Cannibal Army. Butteur Métayer's brother, Amiot Métayer, used to be the leader of the Cannibal Army, but was killed after having called for Aristide's resignation. The Cannibal Army then turned against Aristide (Erikson 2005:85; International Crisis Group 2006b:6). In a short time, former members of the demobilised army, FAd'H (*Forces Armées d'Haïti*), and former police chiefs joined the Cannibal Army and took over the insurgency, and on February 29 Aristide left Haiti for the Central African

Republic<sup>14</sup> (Dupuy 2005:186). That moment represents the start of the context for this analysis, and the position of the chosen actors at that moment is interesting because it can tell something about Aristide's legitimacy.

#### **4.1.1 The Group of 184**

The International Crisis Group contends that the Group of 184 – in spite of being an initiative from the civil society – fairly quickly turned into a coalition with a political mandate, because of its role in the anti-Aristide campaign in 2003-2004.<sup>15</sup> During a public meeting arranged by the Group of 184 in the slum area Cité Soleil of Port-au-Prince in the autumn of 2003, armed groups paid by the government resorted to violence to make the representatives of the Group of 184 leave. A scramble for the sympathy of the poor between Aristide on the one hand, and the Group of 184 on the other was seemingly taking place (International Crisis Group 2004:9). On December 5, a student demonstration in Port-au-Prince was attacked by government-supporting armed groups, who entered the university and smashed the rector's knees. That incidence made the alliance 'Democratic Platform' demand the departure of Aristide. 'Democratic Platform' was an alliance between *Convergence Démocratique*, which was a coalition of opposition parties, and the Group of 184 (International Crisis Group 2004:9; International Crisis Group 2005b:3). According to the International Crisis Group (2005b:3), by February 2004 *Convergence Démocratique* had ceased to exist, and the Group of 184 took its position as representative of the opposition.

On February 21 2004, in the midst of the armed rebellion against Aristide, a delegation from the international community<sup>16</sup> came up with a proposal for a peaceful solution. The proposal consisted in letting Aristide complete his term on the condition

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<sup>14</sup> Within 24 hours, Aristide accused the US of pushing him out, claiming he was the victim of a *coup d'état* and a modern kidnapping. To what extent his observations were correct is disputed, but there seems to be evidence that he boarded the plane who took him away from Haiti willingly (Erikson 2005:87-88). In March 2004 Aristide went to Jamaica, where he stayed for ten weeks, before he left for indefinite exile in South Africa (Dupuy 2005:186).

<sup>15</sup> This is a disputed issue. The Group of 184 contends that it sticks to its civil society profile (Apaid et al 2005).

<sup>16</sup> The delegation included representatives from Canada, France and Latin America (Erikson 2005:86).



that he accepted a prime minister from the opposition and a multiparty government. Aristide accepted, but the opposition refused, insisting on Aristide's resignation (Erikson 2005:86). On February 29 Aristide left Haiti in a plane chartered by the US. Aristide's departure appeared rather confusing – before he left he submitted a letter of resignation to officials at the US embassy, but the next day he accused the US for organising his ousting (Erikson 2005:87). According to Erikson (2005:88), however, it does not seem like Aristide was forced onboard the plane. The opposition, including the Group of 184, considered Aristide's departure as the only possible solution, and no longer considered him as the legitimate president in February 2004. What about the UN? Did the UN deplore Aristide's departure from Haitian politics?

#### **4.1.2 The UN**

Resolution 1529 was adopted on February 29 2004, the same day Aristide left Haiti. It authorised the immediate deployment of the MIF with a mandate of three months, “to contribute to a secure and stable environment (...) in order to support Haitian President Alexandre's request for international assistance to support the constitutional political process under way in Haiti” (United Nations Security Council 2004a). This indicates that Interim President Alexandre – and not Aristide – was considered the legitimate president by the UN. Resolution 1542 of April 30 2004 replaced the MIF with the MINUSTAH, with force levels of 1 622 civilian police and up to 6 700 troops. Among other things, the mandate consisted in assisting the Interim Government and the HNP with a Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programme for all armed groups (United Nations Security Council 2004b). By Resolution 1608 of June 22 2005 it was decided to extend the strength of the MINUSTAH during the electoral period and the following transition (United Nations Security Council 2005).

### 4.1.3 Préval

As a former ally of Aristide, Préval's position concerning Aristide's departure is highly interesting. In May 2006, International Crisis Group (2006a:7) reported that since January the same year, there had been a reduction in violence and crime in Port-au-Prince, possibly reflecting Préval's support among gang and community leaders in the city's poorer areas. However, on the date of Aristide's birthday, July 15, Lavalas-members went to the streets claiming the return of their leader, arguing that they had voted for Préval to assure Aristide's return (Collectif Haïti de France 2006a). This arguably indicates that some of the support for Préval in the elections was grounded in a hope that Préval, if victorious, would allow the return of his former ally.

Préval, on his side, has underscored the fact that he was never a member of *Fanmi Lavalas*, and he has even criticised its government for being corrupt<sup>17</sup>. To journalists asking him about Aristide's situation, Préval has referred to the constitution, which allows all Haitians to leave and enter the country. However, diplomats representing countries that are involved in Haitian transition and peace-building as well as the International Crisis Group, contend that an early return would have a destabilising effect on the fragile situation in Haiti (International Crisis Group 2006a:2, 9-10).

To sum up, after his second term, Aristide had seemingly lost legitimacy among several groups. I will now turn to the 2006-election and the question of whether those elections provided Haiti with a more uniting sovereign than Aristide was.

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<sup>17</sup> In November 2005 Aristide was accused of having plundered the State's till, stolen from the national Haitian telecom company (Téléco) and been involved in drug trafficking in Haiti. The accusations were withdrawn in July 2006 by the new government (Collectif Haïti de France 2006a).

## 4.2 The actors' position around the 2006-election – a uniting, legitimate sovereign in Haiti today?

To escape the State of nature, Hobbes underscores the importance of an Assembly under which the people can unite. Locke emphasises separation of powers and popular consent. All of these are ingredients in a democracy. One can safely say that Haiti – with its history of attempted and successful *coups d'état* – suffers from a lack of democratic tradition. Whenever a pro-poor government has held the power, the elite has sought to overthrow it, and vice versa. This 'tradition' for *coups d'état* started early: between 1911 and 1915, seven different presidents were overthrown (Robinson 1996:265). More recent examples are the elite's backing of General Cédras in 1991 and an alleged attempted *coup* against Aristide in December 2001.<sup>18</sup>

However, Haiti is a democracy today, at least on paper: There is a democratically elected assembly, government and president, but drawbacks are evident. First of all, the ballot papers and vote tallies found at a garbage dump after the 2006 elections indicate that the votes of many Haitians – some of whom had possibly been walking for hours, maybe days, to cast their votes – were not counted (International Crisis Group 2006a:5). In Journal of Democracy's Election Watch from April 2006, the election and the vote count were characterised as "marred by violence and allegations of fraud" (Election Watch 2006). Second, when the judiciary in practice is subordinate to the executive branch, the principle of separation of powers is not respected (World Bank 2006:53). Third, partly due to underpayment in public sector and a tradition of using public office to assure private gain, corruption is widespread (World Bank 2006:40). In other words, although democratic on paper, Haiti still has a way to go as far as democracy is concerned. What was the position of the chosen actors around the 2006-elections? As showed in chapter two, it was decided to use the 'Belgian Formula' for counting the votes and Préval received a narrow majority of the votes, 51%, in the first round of the elections.

### 4.2.1 Préval

René Préval is – like his predecessor Aristide was in early years – popular among the poor Haitians, but he is also aware that he is dependent on the members of the business class for investments (Dupuy 2006:137). In chapter two I mentioned that Préval has designed the two important lines of politics on which Prime Minister Alexis intends to base the government's actions. One of those lines concerned creation of good conditions for investment so as to create wealth for the benefit of *all* Haitians (Radio Kiskeya 2006:2). -In Alexis' words:

The President (...) has already declared that the solution in the battle against misery and the expensive life which feeds it will not be found in charity, nor in humanitarian aid programmes, but in investments, so that more goods can be available in markets, to prices that are competitive, and more jobs can be created. (Radio Kiskeya 2006:11, my translation)

During the electoral campaign Préval did not present any clear programme. According to Doucet (2007 [personal conversation]), his campaign was based on the principles of 'no promises', 'no speaking' and 'no programme', and the speeches he *did* make were hard to decode. Knowing that Haitians were tired of promises from the international community and from politicians, Doucet (2007 [personal conversation]) argues, Préval's aim was to make a dialogue with the population. During this campaign Préval asked the voters to base their evaluation of him on his achievements – such as building of schools, roads and public squares – during his first presidency. He also emphasised the necessity of investments in education of the poor, so as to harmonise the relations between the social classes, and a “national dialogue and permanent consultation” (Renois 2006). Other themes he brought up during his campaign were modernisation of democratic institutions and an increase in the capacity of the HNP (Renois 2006).

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<sup>18</sup> On December 17 2001 the National Palace was attacked by armed men, and the incidence was described as a *coup* attempt by *Fanmi Lavalas*. However, the responsible were never identified (International Crisis Group 2004:8).

### **4.2.2 The Group of 184**

In a press release following the announcement of Préval's victory in the elections in February 2006, the Group of 184 expressed disappointment with what they called "a deficit of legitimacy that could have been avoided" (Group of 184 2006, my translation), referring to the decision to use the Belgian formula when counting the votes. According to the Group, that decision was not in accordance with Haitian law, and was pushed forward by the international community, the menacing violence and division within the Provisional Electoral Council, added to unacceptable involvement by the executive (Group of 184 2006). In other words, the Group did not seem to consider Préval as a legitimate sovereign.

Nevertheless, former Executive Secretary of the Group of 184 Jean Claude Cerin contends that the Group of 184 decided to keep a relatively low profile during the months following the elections, so as to give the new government a chance. However, since the proclamation of the New Social Contract, he argues, the Group intends to constantly put pressure on the governing instances to make them execute the points outlined in the Contract (Cerin 2007 [e-mail]).

### **4.2.3 The UN**

On March 27 2006 the UN Security Council congratulated Préval on the election, stating that the elections and the results represented a "unique possibility to break with the violence and political instability in the past" (United Nations Security Council 2006c). The high voter turnout (65%) was also emphasised as very positive (United Nations Security Council 2006b; United Nations Security Council 2006c). Similarly, when UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon visited Haiti in August 2007, he did not raise any doubt about the legitimacy of the executive: "For the first time in a long while, Haiti has a stable, democratically elected government, widely accepted across all social strata and by all political parties" (Ban 2007b).

#### **4.2.4 The legitimacy of the sovereign: comparing Aristide and Préval**

There are controversies concerning the elections in 2006 that brought President Préval to power, and the Group of 184 was disappointed with what they called a ‘deficit of legitimacy’. However, the fact that the Group decided to keep a low profile after the elections supposedly indicates that it did recognise the results. Anyhow, a ‘low profile’ is not descriptive of the Group’s *modus operandi* prior to Aristide’s departure. Comparing the Group’s behaviour vis-à-vis Aristide with their attitude towards Préval, one can argue that Préval is more of a legitimate uniting sovereign in the eyes of the Group of 184 than Aristide was. The same tendency seems to count for the UN’s attitude to the two presidents: While Aristide’s departure was accepted by the UN, who from that day on considered Interim President Alexandre – and not Aristide – the legitimate president, the UN has raised no doubt over the legitimacy of Préval. When it comes to Préval himself, he has been vague in his statements about his former ally Aristide.

Above I argued that the institution of the presidency was weakened under Aristide. It seems like this institution has been strengthened since his departure, and perhaps in particular since the election of Préval. Préval has called for a constitutional amendment to make it possible for presidents to be re-elected. Whether or not the Haitian constitution will allow for consecutive presidential terms in the future, Préval cannot be re-elected, because his actual term is the second one, and at the moment no proposals for changes to the number of presidential terms – which is limited to two in the Haitian constitution – have been made. In addition, Préval has pointed out that he does not have the intention to present himself again (Katz 2007). The fact that he comes with such a proposal, but not for his own benefit, supposedly increases his legitimacy. The lack of consent seems to have been a significant source of conflict under Aristide’s second term, but – albeit to a smaller degree – this still persists under Préval, first and foremost because of irregularities in the elections that brought him to power.

## 4.3 Other factors that keep the conflict alive

### 4.3.1 The role of violent gangs in the conflict: “laws are silent among arms”...

Another factor that has a destabilising effect on the situation, which is related to the question of lack of popular consent, is the violent gangs. Because of Aristide’s popularity among the poor, he had many supporters among the young, disillusioned members of the violent gangs. Since Aristide’s departure, those supporters have contributed to worsen the conditions for development of popular consent. The gang activity arguably has many points in common with Hobbes’ State of nature and the ‘war of every man against every man’.

During the election campaign in 2000, militant gangs from the slums of Port-au-Prince, supporting Aristide, started to take the law in their own hands, attacking political opponents, journalists and human rights activists. *Chimères* became the word for members of a new sort of paramilitary squads serving as the government’s enforcers.<sup>19</sup> Aristide refused to build apolitical state institutions, and the *Chimérisation* was the first measure taken in that regard. Whether Aristide was directly involved in the creation and direction of the *Chimères* or not, remains unclear. What is significant, however, is that he never condemned them or declared them illegal, and that the *Chimères* did the government’s ‘dirty work’ (Dupuy 2005:192). The second measure related to his refusal to build apolitical state institutions was complete control over the HNP, which became increasingly involved in drug-trafficking (International Crisis Group 2004:7).

In Haiti’s ongoing conflict, violent gangs still play an important role. Some of the gangs have political agendas – such as assuring Aristide’s return to Haiti – and others seemingly only have violence, drug trafficking and blackmailing on their agendas.

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<sup>19</sup> The tradition of private government-supporting militias was established under Duvalier, first with his *Cagoulards* and later the *Tonton Macoutes*. Under the military regimes from 1986-94, there were *Zenglendos*, and the tradition was followed by Aristide, with the *Chimères* (Egset and Mattner 2005).

Drugs are indeed a growing problem in Haiti. Corrupt HNP officers take part in trafficking networks and Venezuelan and Colombian traffickers use Haitian landing stripes or drop packages of cocaine into the sea near the Haitian coast. In the islands of Ile à Vache and Ile de la Grosse Caye, no obstacles to the trafficking exist, as the police lack patrol boats (International Crisis Group 2007b:18-19).

According to the International Crisis Group (2006b:2-3), the Popular Organisations that fought for Aristide's return from exile during Cédras' regime, represent the genesis of several of today's armed groups. However, all Popular Organisations are not the same:

These groups still cling to the rhetoric of resistance and the struggle for the poor. Given their often Robin Hood-like relationship with the impoverished communities in which they live, as well as the near total lack of state services there, this rhetoric occasionally has substance. The criminal groups have less to do with Robin Hood than with organized theft and corrupt police (...) HNP and MINUSTAH officials describe sophisticated gang activity that (...) reflects training by transnational criminals, ex-military or police. (International Crisis Group 2006b:5)

The Popular Organisations started with resistance against Jean-Claude Duvalier and the various military regimes that followed him, through the democracy movement. Some turned into armed *Chimères* under Aristide (International Crisis Group 2006b:5). The fact that police and former military personnel participate in gang activity, is indeed a paradox. To understand how that is possible, knowledge about Haiti's frail institutional framework is necessary.

#### **4.3.2 The role of institutions – and their collapse – in the conflict**

The institution of the presidency was arguably weakened under Aristide in the sense that it lost legitimacy. Fatton (2002: xi) argues that due to the extreme poverty in which many Haitians live, an individualistic and indifferent 'every man for himself' - attitude has developed in the country. Instead of providing services to the population, the state has been preoccupied with its relations to the economic elite, whose investments in human resources and infrastructure, according to the World Bank (2006:39), are of little importance. In addition, corruption has permeated public



sector, repeated political crises and stagnation in the institution-building process have made donors withdraw support to the public sector, and development assistance has been inefficient – supposedly because the institutions have been too weak to absorb it. Spending on pure public goods has thus been extremely low in Haiti (International Crisis Group 2004:8; World Bank 2006:39-41).

As noted above, there is widespread agreement that something happened to the personality of Aristide during his exile from 1991 to 1994. In spite of UN efforts, self-sustaining democratic institutions, coalition-building and economic development remained weak or even absent after his return in 1994, and Haitians continued to live in poverty. The army, FAd'H, was demobilised, but many of the former members turned to private security forces or criminal organisations. Organised crime – such as drug trafficking – increased, and privately held weapons were not collected. In addition, there was no broad participation in institution-building initiatives (International Crisis Group 2004:5).

During Aristide's last term, from 2000 to 2004, the police-force was increasingly politicised and involved in corruption, drugs-trafficking and criminal networks. The pro-Aristide gang-members, the *Chimères*, were even integrated into the HNP. In 2001 Aristide launched his crime-preventing campaign 'Operation Zero Tolerance', allowing violence and police-abuse against real as well as supposed criminals. During the 2004 political crisis that led to the ousting of Aristide, the HNP practically collapsed. Police stations were attacked and burnt down, and officers fled (International Crisis Group 2004:20; World Bank 2006:50). In 2005, the International Crisis Group (2005a:13) reported that rules for police-uniforms and identification of vehicles were absent, factors that decrease effectiveness as well as trustworthiness.

Justice and rule of law is another area of institutional weakness in Haiti, and it contributes to fire up under the violence and instability in the sense that people take the law in their own hands. Again, drawing lines to the State of nature is relevant. The World Bank (2006:53) underscores the hardly disputable fact that the rule of law is a necessary condition for investment and economic growth, as well as development

and empowerment of the poor. The Haitian Constitution of 1987 guarantees the independence of the judiciary, but in practice the judiciary is subordinate to the executive branch. The judicial budget as well as education, appointment and dismissal of judges are controlled by the minister of justice. Judges are underpaid, lack access to necessary legal texts, and many even lack law degrees. In the 2004 riots, the court system's physical infrastructure was partly destroyed, and records and files – when they exist – are in a deplorable state. Due to problems of communication, inadequate management- and tracking of files, as well as poor quality of orders for transfer and release of prisoners, the administration of justice is extremely slow. Some detainees have to wait months, even years, before they see a judge (World Bank 2006:53-54).

On the client-side of the justice system, most Haitians have no access to judicial aid, mainly for three reasons: First, due to an inefficient civil registry, 40% of the population does not have the civil identity documentation required. Second, most legal proceedings and documents are in French, which excludes the Creole-speaking majority of the population. Third, the state is not obliged to provide a lawyer, so those who are unable to pay for a lawyer themselves – which probably also represents a majority of the population – are also excluded from this system. All of this creates an environment where people literally take the law in their own hands instead of resolving problems through formal mechanisms (World Bank 2006:54-55).<sup>20</sup> It also contributes to the marginalisation of the poor, Creole-spoken majority of the population.

The conflict seems to be connected to the lamentable condition of important institutions such as the HNP and the justice sector in several ways: On the one hand, the politicisation and collapse of the HNP made police officers involve in criminal activities. On the other hand, for individuals that belong to the lower social strata,

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<sup>20</sup> In July 2007, six cases of lynching were reported during one week in Haiti. According to Edmond Mulet, representative of the UN Secretary-General in Haiti at that time, such incidences can be related to Haitians' lack of trust in the justice system (Collectif Haïti de France 2007e).

poverty combined with exclusion from many of the formal institutions force them to resort to informal- or illegal methods. In other words, the institutional weaknesses seem to play a significant role in the paradoxical scenario of young thugs from the slums and police officers cooperating in the same violent gangs.

#### 4.4 Lack of popular consent

Hypothesis 1 represents one interpretation of the reasons behind the current conflict in Haiti, namely that lack of popular consent makes it impossible for the people to unite under the democratically elected sovereign. But is this lack of popular consent only due to discussions over the political leadership?

According to Robinson, Haiti's political culture is a result of different factors:

Several factors stand out: the peculiar class and racial composition of the dominant groups; the complete fusion of elite rule with the state and the absence of any civil society; an entrenched culture of authoritarianism, corruption and violence bequeathed by the Spanish, the French and the Northamericans; and most of all, the crippling limits imposed on Haitians' ability to determine their own national conditions by the country's subordinate position in the world system. (Robinson 1996:260)

Pierre (2006:4) on his side attributes the violent political culture to lack of consensus among social actors regarding appropriation and usage of resources. Kumar (1998:54) blames the extractive nature of the state – ever since independence – for deterring development. What foreign officers may interpret as substantive debates over economic reform or electoral policy, he argues, actually hide the elites' agendas. Although there are nuances in the different interpretations of Haitian society, the facts that the social cleavages in Haiti are immense, and that the interests of the different classes have little in common, remain undisputed. *Absence of popular consent* seems to be a problem in Haiti, and it seems that although disagreement concerning the ousting of Aristide, the violent gangs, the institutional collapse, and to some extent also the 2006-elections, are central in the ongoing conflict, Haiti's history shows that lack of consensus has deep roots in the Haitian political culture and the socio-economic structure. Disagreements concerning Aristide used to be related to class in

the early nineties, when he still lived up to his image as a serious politician with the intention to improve the conditions for the poor. At that time his opponents were situated at the top of the socioeconomic ladder and his supporters at the bottom. After his return from exile, however, many of his supporters became increasingly sceptical to his methods and what started to look more like lust for power than political will (Broussard 2002).

## 4.5 Conclusion

In this chapter I have discussed the question of legitimacy. Through an analysis of the positions of the chosen actors regarding Aristide and Préval, I have sought to find out whether relating the conflict in Haiti to the president's lack of legitimacy is correct or not. I found that although the elections that brought Préval to power were controversial, and in particular the Group of 184 was sceptical to Préval's victory, Préval is considered a more legitimate sovereign than Aristide was, particularly during his second term, in the eyes of the UN and the Group of 184. In other words, there seems to have been improvements the last few years concerning the legitimacy of the Haitian presidency.

However, the chosen actors for this analysis are not alone on the Haitian scene, and although the security situation reportedly has improved, the situation in Haiti still suffers from several important drawbacks that all seem to fire up under the conflict: First of all, the widespread and violent gang activity leads the thoughts to Hobbes' State of nature and 'every man against every man'. Second, the institutional framework has partly collapsed. Third, there are major socio-economic gaps, and finally, the democratic foundation that carries the Haitian political institutions is extremely fragile. In other words, although the sovereign today to a greater extent than earlier is considered legitimate, other factors keep the conflict alive. Hence, although saying that the conflict in Haiti is due to absence of the popular consent that is required to unite the people under a democratically elected sovereign *alone* is not correct, Hypothesis 1 arguably has been strengthened.

## 5 Analysis 2

*Hypothesis 2: Social capital and a strong civil society are necessary ingredients in a solution to the conflict in Haiti*

In the theoretical framework I referred to Paris (2004:156), who defines civil society as “the space or arena between the household and the state in which citizens engage in organised activities that are not governmental in nature, but nevertheless ‘public’”. According to the theories outlined in the theoretical framework, an active civil society has many advantages: It serves as a counterforce to the state, and plays an important role in pushing the state towards reform (Grugel 2002:115). It also has an educative function in areas such as negotiation and compromise, and when individuals belong to several social groups at the same time, single lines of conflict become less frequent (Paris 2004:156). Grugel (2002:115) emphasises that civil society organisations should not be confused with other forms of political representation, because the roles are different: Civil society’s role is to control the state and to put pressure on it.

In this chapter I will discuss the position of the chosen actors concerning promotion of civil society and social capital. In an attempt to test Hypothesis 2, I will relate those efforts and initiatives to the question of conflict resolution. Knowledge about particularities of the Haitian civil society is necessary in the context of such analysis. Hence, prior to an analysis of the civil society and social capital in Haiti between February 2004 and October 2007, it is relevant to take a look at the past.

### 5.1 Historical background for the particularities of Haitian civil society

François ‘Papa Doc’ Duvalier was elected president in 1957, and in 1964 he declared himself ‘President for Life’. His regime was one of permanent and institutionalised terror, and he created a patronage network of people from the lower classes, local

sheriffs and *houngans*<sup>21</sup>. This network provided the basis for Duvalier's paramilitary squads, the *Tonton Macoutes*. In 1972 Papa Doc died, and his nineteen year-old son, Jean-Claude 'Baby Doc' Duvalier was appointed second 'President for Life'. In February 1986 Baby Doc was forced to give up the power, and was escorted to exile in France. The following five years were characterised by a power-vacuum, with strikes, demonstrations, government shifts, conventions of opposition groups, arrests, shootings and massacres (Robinson 1996:268-269, 275-276).

Duvalierism had succeeded in eliminating nearly all linkages between the state and civil society by cleansing the society of all private initiatives which typically constitute pillars in the civil society (Robinson 1996:277). Nevertheless, during the 1970s an independent and dynamic press had started to develop. At the same time the so-called *Liberation Theology* contributed to spread ideas of social justice and solidarity through small committees called *Ti Légliz*<sup>22</sup> throughout the country – a movement that was headed by Aristide (Fatton 2002:66; Smarth 1998:20). The independent press in particular played a significant role in the subversion of the Duvalier regime in February 1986 (Smarth 1998:39). Due to their experience with democracy, the Haitians living abroad also played a very important role in the process of 'opening of the conscience' of Haitians in Haiti, argues Smarth (1998:33). Another group which had an impact on this development was the intelligentsia (Smarth 1998:47).

During the turbulent five years following the departure of Baby Doc there was an explosion of different sorts of organisations, which were placed under the umbrella Popular Organisations in Haiti. The great majority of the Popular Organisations belong to the left, and one objective – or a dream – which is typical for many of them, is to control the state (Smarth 1998:20-23). Related to this dream is a tendency to – although they start out as social initiatives, rooted in civil society – eventually

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<sup>21</sup> *Houngans* are voodoo-priests.

<sup>22</sup> *Ti Légliz* means 'Little Church' in Creole.

acquire a politico-social profile because politics is so present in the Haitian society (Smarth 1998:121). Another typical feature of the Haitian Popular Organisations is that they tend to make alliances with each other at critical moments, when they find it necessary to gather the democratic forces in more efficient *fronts communs* (Smarth 1998:100).

“Rather than constituting a coherent social project”, Fatton (2002:29) argues, “Haitian civil society has tended to embody a disorganized plurality of mutually exclusive projects that are not necessarily democratic.” The Popular Organisations play confusing roles in several ways: First, paradoxically enough, many of those organisations have resorted to violence in their battle for democracy and freedom, and hence arguably contributed to rendering society both less free and less democratic (International Crisis Group 2006b:2-3,5). Second, the question of whether they are attached to civil society or to the political arena, or both, in some cases remains quite unclear. In other words, the particularities of Haitian civil society arguably are not consistent with a sound and active civil society according to the definitions outlined in the theoretical framework. In addition, some of the organisations even contribute to fire up under the conflict as they use violent means for promoting their cause. In what follows I will first – with reference to the theoretical framework – define central mechanisms for inclusion into civil society. Then I will discuss what the chosen actors do to create an active civil society and social capital, before I finally turn to the question of civil society’s role in conflict-prevention.

## 5.2 Mechanisms for inclusion into civil society

In the theoretical framework I referred to Grugel (2002:94), who points out resources, knowledge, recognition and self-esteem as necessary for participation in civil society. Hence, *learning* arguably is an important mechanism for inclusion in civil society. People cannot understand by themselves how they should proceed to make their voices heard in a legal manner, or how the political processes function. The

institutional aspect is central in this case, as illiteracy is a widespread problem in Haiti, and many Haitians never attend school.<sup>23</sup> In general, education arguably also has a positive effect on self-esteem and recognition.

In addition to the important role of formal education, there are other sources of information that are important. For instance, the role of the large Haitian Diaspora when it comes to learning about civil society abroad should definitely not be ignored (Smarth 1998:33). Other significant, related mechanisms are various means of communication. Grugel (2002:98) mentions TV or newspaper as means for learning how social groups elsewhere proceed. In Haiti, radio is the most important media (Doucet 2007 [personal conversation]). Freedom of speech is an important issue in this relation. According to International Freedom of Expression Exchange (2007), eight Haitian journalists have been murdered since 2000, and at least three of them were killed because of their work. The most mediatised case is the one of Jean Dominique, who was shot down outside his radio station Radio Haïti-Inter in April 2000. Seven years later the murderers remain unpunished (International Freedom of Expression Exchange 2007).

Besides, telephone, the Internet and means of transport are useful for getting in touch with other organisations, the Diaspora, or even the state apparatus. Haitian means of communication are, in general, in a deplorable state.<sup>24</sup> In what follows I will discuss what the chosen actors do in terms of preparing the grounds for and active and sound civil society. I will discuss their direct efforts in promoting civil society, but also their indirect efforts in terms of focusing on education, freedom of speech or means of communication.

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<sup>23</sup> Recent data concerning illiteracy is not available, but in 1990, the literacy rate for persons of 15 years and older was 39,7%. The net primary enrolment was 22% in 1991, recent data on the matter is not available (UNDP 2006).

<sup>24</sup> In 2004 there were 17 telephone mainlines per 1 000 Haitians, and in 2003 there were 48 mobile phone subscribers and 59 Internet users per 1 000 Haitians (UNDP 2006).



## 5.3 The actors' direct and indirect efforts for the benefit of civil society

### 5.3.1 The Group of 184

Although it has been maintained that the Group of 184 on some occasions has approached the political domain, no one has ever ran as candidate for elections for the Group of 184 (Apaid et al 2005).<sup>25</sup> In the theoretical framework I referred to Paris (2004:156), who defines civil society as "the space or arena in which citizens engage in organised activities that are not governmental in nature, but nevertheless 'public'." Based on that definition of civil society, I would argue that the Group of 184 is effectively absorbed into the domain of civil society, and stays within its borders. Being an umbrella organisation that claims to cover close to 500 different initiatives from the civil society (Lahens 2007 [e-mail]), it assumedly plays a role in terms of influencing those initiatives to stay within the scope of civil society.

In addition, one of the points on the Group of 184's agenda, the New Social Contract, concerns strengthening the associations of civil society. Another point in the Contract, which is related to Grugel's (2002:94) list of necessary elements for participation in civil society, is education. The Contract insists on the necessity of providing all Haitians with the same references and to include the values of citizenship in formal and informal education programmes, and it ascertains the group's engagement in those matters (Collectif Haïti de France 2005). The declaration of the creation of the Group of 184 was published in 2002, before the start of the delimited period for this analysis. However, it is relevant to mention that in the declaration, one of the group's requirements was public action against those behind

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<sup>25</sup> In the period around the ousting of Aristide in 2004 the International Crisis Group (2004:9) argued that the Group of 184 developed a more political image. However, to what extent the Group of 184 really has a political mandate can be disputed: In July 2005, Charles-Henry Baker, a leading figure and representative of the private sector of the Group of 184, announced that he would leave the committee, and be a candidate for the presidential elections. The group then made it clear that membership in the Group of 184 was not compatible with such a project, and seized the opportunity for affirming that it "is a non-partisan space of dialogue and co-determination for the strengthening of civil society and the modernisation of the political space" (Apaid et al 2005, my translation).

the murder of Jean Dominique and improved conditions of work for journalists, students and teachers before elections could take place (Alterpresse 2002).<sup>26</sup>

### **5.3.2 Préval**

In chapter two it was noted that Préval is the architect behind the political orientations for the government. The first orientation concerns modernisation of the state, and a framework has been elaborated for this planned modernisation. One of the objectives of the government is defined as follows in the framework: “to promote a civil society able to influence the different strategic decisions and constitute a veritable social counterweight” (Bonne gouvernance: 8, my translation). The second orientation concerns creation of wealth through private investment. Telecommunications and new technology in the domain of communication are among the priorities in focus in relation to the second orientation. Although the objective is to create an investment-friendly environment – and does not concern civil society directly – it serves the interests of civil society as well (Radio Kiskeya 2006:7).

Préval also underscores the importance of education as a means of harmonising the relations between rich and poor, and a step towards social and economic reconciliation (Renois 2006). Again it is noteworthy that this apparently is not a measure directly related to promotion of civil society, but knowledge and learning – and hence education – are mechanisms for absorption into civil society.

As to the question of freedom of speech and the unsolved murders of journalists, Préval in August 2007 announced the creation of a committee that will review the investigation of those cases. A joint initiative between Préval and the organisation SOS Journalistes, the committee is independent from the government (International Freedom of Expression Exchange 2007). International Freedom of Expression Exchange (2007) relates the so far particularly inefficient and slow character of Jean

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<sup>26</sup> This demand was not met. As mentioned above, the Jean Dominique’s murderers have still not been punished (International Freedom of Expression Exchange 2007).

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Dominique's case to incompetence and lack of political will. Préval apparently – through words as well as actions – shed light on many aspects that are important for an active civil society and social capital to develop. What about the UN? What is the organisation's approach to civil society, and does it do anything to promote civil society in Haiti?

### **5.3.3 The UN**

The United Nations once dealt only with Governments. By now we know that peace and prosperity cannot be achieved without partnerships involving Governments, international organizations, the business community and civil society. In today's world, we depend on each other. (Annan 2007)

During his visit to Haiti in August 2007, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon followed up the principle of his predecessor quoted above, and had breakfast with leaders of civil society, the private sector and political parties (Ban 2007a). The UN's mandate in Haiti does not concern the civil society. However, the fact that civil society's role in peace-building enterprises is recognised by the UN is probably encouraging. In addition, such gatherings represent an opportunity for the leaders of NGOs to meet with politicians. The importance of such opportunities should not be ignored. In a country where the means of communication are in a poor condition, they represent a great arena for lobbying.

The three actors all seem to recognise the necessity of civil society in a peace-building process. In addition they show concern over factors – such as education and freedom of speech – that are not directly related to the promotion of civil society and social capital, but nevertheless are among the mechanisms that indirectly can help to absorb individuals into civil society. I will now return to the assumption in Hypothesis 2, and discuss the prospective role of the actors' indirect and direct efforts in a solution to the conflict in Haiti.

## 5.4 Can the actors' intentions and actions related to civil society contribute to consolidation of peace? If so, how?

According to the International Crisis Group, “as long as possibilities through education and employment do not exist, gangs will” (International Crisis Group 2006b:5). As I argued in chapter two, gangs carry a large share of the responsibility for the violent and insecure situation in Haiti. The fact that a great number of the Port-au-Prince based gangs base their economy on kidnapping (International Crisis Group 2006b:6) is one example. There seems to be little doubt that the security situation in Haiti would gain a lot from the ‘gang-cum-civil society organisation hybrids’ being transformed into ‘real’ civil society organisations.

In particular the actors’ focus on education can have an effect on the gang activity, and hence the violence that ravages the Haitian society. Explicit recognition of civil society organisations among important actors such as Préval and the UN can also inspire members of the organisations that resort to violent means to promote their cause, to integrate to civil society. By making those connected to such organisations understand that the legal channels for exchange of views are more efficient than violence, authorities like the UN and Préval arguably can contribute to peace through promotion of civil society. The same applies to Haitians abroad, who might have learned about how an active civil society can function in other countries. However, without a free media and efficient means of communication, passing such messages is virtually impossible, so the actors’ focus in that respect is also highly relevant to conflict resolution through promotion of civil society.

## 5.5 Conclusion

This chapter has dealt with the question of whether an effective civil society and social capital are necessary for a solution to the conflict in Haiti. To understand why and how Haitian civil society has ended up where it is today, knowledge about

Haitian civil society's history is necessary. Haitian civil society today does not meet the criteria of a sound and active civil society that were outlined in the theoretical framework. One important problem seems to be that the borders of Haitian civil society are blurred, and many of the initiatives that started out within those borders, sooner or later move towards the political domain or the violent gangs. With reference to the theoretical framework, I presented a set of direct and indirect mechanisms for inclusion into civil society, and I analysed the efforts and strategies of the selected actors in relation to those mechanisms. The three actors indeed have a focus on mechanisms for absorption into civil society.

Gang activity is an important element in the conflict in Haiti. My analysis of the historical background for the characteristics of the Haitian civil society shows that those violent gangs are actually fairly close to the civil society. Therefore I argue that if they are effectively included into real civil society, it will have a positive effect on Haiti's security situation. Hence, Hypothesis 2 has been strengthened: social capital and an active civil society seem to be necessary elements in a peaceful solution.

## 6 Analysis 3

Hypothesis 3: *If there is broad-based dialogue and compromise among actors from the political society, the international community and civil society, in addition to an effective institutional framework, one can assume that a peace-building process is on its way in Haiti*

In the introduction and in the theoretical framework I referred to Cousens and her definition of the objectives of peace-building. In that definition she emphasises “...tools a society can develop to manage (...) conflict authoritatively and legitimately” (Cousens 2001:12). In Hypothesis 3 tools prescribed in Roland Paris’ ‘macro’-approach to peace-building and Chetan Kumar and Elizabeth Cousens’ ‘micro’-approach are combined, postulating that if the criteria outlined in those theories are met, a peace-building process is on its way.

Although the three actors chosen for this analysis are not alone in the Haitian landscape, they did play central roles on the Haitian scene during the delimited time period. Therefore, analysing their position when it comes to the criteria for peace-building outlined in Hypothesis 3 is highly relevant. It is important, however, to point out that their mandates and roles are different, and it arguably would not be realistic to expect the UN to have the same approach to broad-based dialogue and compromise in practice as the national actors. That is also why the three actors cannot be expected to focus on all the aspects of the institutional framework, which are defined here by five of Paris’ (2004:188) six key elements of the IBL-strategy. I will return to the elements of the IBL-strategy below, but first I will discuss what the actors do, or intend to do, in relation to broad-based dialogue and compromise.

### 6.1 Broad-based dialogue and compromise among actors

In the theoretical framework I gave a definition for each of the criteria, or independent variables, in Hypothesis 3: *Broad-based dialogue* is understood as “a

dialogue that focuses on long-term interests and includes different sectors”.

*Compromise among actors from the political society, the international community and civil society* implies “gathering local political and civil leaders from different sectors for an exchange of interests and strategies and creation of a common agenda”.

### **6.1.1 The Group of 184**

Arguably, the Group of 184 is particularly interesting in the context of Hypothesis 3, because the entire project of the Group of 184 is a product of broad-based dialogue and compromise: When the creation of the group was declared in 2002, 184 different organisations, groups and institutions from twelve different sectors of the Haitian society were represented (Alterpresse 2002). Even more specifically, the Group of 184’s *Caravane de l’espoir* is an example of broad-based dialogue according to Kumar’s definition: The campaign was directed towards Popular Organisations in Port-au-Prince and associations from all sectors in Port-au-Prince, provincial towns and the towns abroad with an important number of Haitians. The objective of the campaign was twofold: One aim was to inform people of the necessity of solving the political crisis, and a second aim was to arrive at a consensus concerning a contract, the New Social Contract, which was published in November 2005 (Collectif Haïti de France 2005; Lahens 2007 [e-mail]). In other words, the campaign included different sectors, and it had a focus on long-term interests.

The New Social Contract is a clear-cut example of compromise according to the definition above: It was conceived through gatherings of representatives from different sectors that led to a consensus about a common agenda. The agenda – the New Social Contract – was launched in November 2005, and it was based on the various interests and strategies (Lahens 2007 [e-mail]). In the section about the institutional framework below I will go into details concerning parts of the content of the New Social Contract, but first I will discuss the positions of Préval and the UN in relation to broad-based dialogue and compromise.

### **6.1.2 Préval**

As argued in relation to Hypothesis 1, Préval based his campaign on dialogue with the population. According to Doucet (2007 [personal conversation]), he did so because he knew Haitians were tired of empty promises from politicians and the international community. In his inauguration speech at the National Palace on May 14 2006, Préval emphasised the necessity of dialogue and cooperation on the way towards peace. The audience consisted of state authorities, leaders of political parties, guests from abroad and representatives from different sectors, and the speech was held in Creole only (Alterpresse 2006). The choice of language is arguably both symbolic and important. Haiti has two official languages, French and Creole, of which the former typically is spoken by the elite. By holding his inauguration speech in Creole, Préval signalled that he is the president of all Haitians, and that everyone is included in the dialogue.

When it comes to compromise, in chapter two I mentioned Préval's compromising reaction when the Chamber of Deputies dismissed minister of culture Daniel Elie, one of Préval's close colleagues. According to Mark L. Schneider (2007), Préval's reaction – which was to gather central members of the Parliament for a budget compromise – might have prevented destabilisation and even bloodshed.

### **6.1.3 The UN**

Resolution 1658 of February 14 2006, shortly after the elections that brought Préval to power, emphasises that: “after that event [the inauguration of the elected president], national reconciliation, inclusiveness and political dialogue will continue to be of fundamental importance for the long-term political, social and economic stability of Haiti” (United Nations Security Council 2006a).

As commented on in relation to Hypothesis 2, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon in August 2007 gathered leaders from civil society, the private sector and political parties in Port-au-Price. He spoke about the role of the leaders as key opinion-makers



towards a “common endeavour” (Ban 2007a). Symbolically, this meeting was important in relation to the principles of broad-based dialogue and compromise. Although Ban did not ask his audience to give its opinion, and although this audience is not in position to influence the UN, he emphasised the importance of different sectors working together towards a common goal: peace.

It is important, however, to mention that there is some degree of discontent with MINUSTAH’s presence in Haiti. The discontent does not only concern the contents of the mandate and a strong desire to see bulldozers instead of tanks, which has been pronounced by Préval on several occasions (Alterpresse 2006; Collectif Haïti de France 2007h). At the local level, people are generally sceptical to how soldiers who do not understand Creole or even French, and who are from completely different cultures, can possibly build peace in Haiti (Doucet 2007 [personal conversation]). Such problems of communication indeed impede the dialogue at the local level. The UN apparently is aware of the problem, however, because the Member States in Resolution 1702 were urged to assist with francophone candidates for the police force (United Nations Security Council 2006c).

Broad-based dialogue and compromise appear to be a concern with high priority on the agendas of the actors in this analysis, and the long-term interest they all strive for seemingly is peace. I will now turn to the elements of Paris’ (2004) IBL-strategy, and discuss what the actors do, or intend to do, in that connection.

## 6.2 Effective institutional framework

*An effective institutional framework* is defined according to five of Paris’ (2004:188) key elements of the IBL-strategy (the third point was dealt with in Hypothesis 2, and will not be discussed here):

1. Wait until conditions are ripe for elections
2. Design electoral systems that reward moderation
3. (Promote good civil society)
4. Control hate speech

5. Adopt conflict-reducing economic policies
6. The common denominator: rebuild effective state institutions

In the theoretical framework I delimited the fifth sixth to comprise institutions in the justice and corrections sectors.

In relation to Hypothesis 1 I introduced Haiti's institutional collapse in certain areas as one of the elements of the conflict. First of all, the corruption of the HNP is a severe problem: On the one hand, gang-members such as the *Chimères* were absorbed into the police force under Aristide's second term, and on the other hand, police officers have been taking part in criminal networks and drug trafficking (International Crisis Group 2004:20). This represents a vicious circle in the sense that the politicisation and collapse of the HNP make police officers take part in criminal activities, which makes the collapse even more extensive. Second, the judicial system is in a deplorable state, and the majority of Haitians do not have access to justice (World Bank 2006:53-55). This represents another vicious circle: Poverty and lack of access to justice makes the poor resort to informal, often illegal, methods, which contributes to increase the rate of criminality and undermine the foundations of a state of law.

Related to the institutions, and in particular the fifth point of the IBL-strategy – conflict-reducing economic policies – knowledge of the Haitian socio-economic structures is necessary. According to Robinson (1996:262-263, 265), the Haitian class structure has its origins from 1804, after independence, when the French elite was replaced by a new, local elite, and chronic instability followed – seven presidents were overthrown between 1911 and 1915. The mulattoes<sup>27</sup>, who had acted as a buffer between the French colonisers and the African slaves, became privileged in the new republic, and represented the new, commercial elite. Fatton (2002:36) calls this elite the *possessing class*. The complexion and racial heritage of the members of this class

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<sup>27</sup> Robinson (1996:263) underscores the fact that sociologically, the categories of 'black' and 'mulatto' should be considered as social constructs that are particular to the Haitian society.

make them unlikely to become part of the political elite, or *the ruling class proper*, to use Fatton's words. An internal process of capital accumulation never really developed in Haiti after independence. The new elite acquired wealth by marketing of peasant production internationally, and the Haitian state – not the production process – became the principal and only source of wealth and power. The commercial and bureaucratic elite extracted this wealth from the peasant population through taxes, duties and theft. This 'tradition' of the ruling elites to consider the state as personal property has had a central position in Haitian political history from 1804 to present (Robinson 1996:259-263).

Trouillot (1990:80-81) presents a similar argument, contending that the socioeconomic organisation of Haiti ever since independence has contributed to a division of the nation into two distinct groups: the urbanites and the agricultural producers. The urbanites are referred to as *leta* (meaning 'the state' in Creole) by the peasant population, regardless of their actual ties to the state apparatus. The peasants, on their side, are referred to as *l'arrière-pays* ('the hinterland') or *moun andeyó* ('people outside'). According to the World Bank (2006:18), however, the probability of being poor today is not more important in rural than in urban areas. As a matter of fact, poverty is slightly more widespread in cities than in the countryside, and education proves to be the most important factor when it comes to reducing the probability of being poor. Hence, *education for all* – which was defined as an indirect mechanism for inclusion to civil society in chapter five and central on the agendas of Préval (Renois 2006) and the Group of 184 (Collectif Haïti de France 2005) – is indirectly also a conflict-reducing economic policy.

Doucet (2007 [personal conversation]) criticises the common apprehension of a Haitian society divided in two; the elite and the poor. She emphasises that the classes are not necessarily in opposition all the time, and that besides, there is a middle-class, which is often forgotten in the literature. However, the fact that a large proportion of the Haitian population lives in poverty remains undisputed. According to the Minister of Economy and Finance, Daniel Dorsainville, in 2006 76 % of all Haitians lived

with less than US\$ 2 per day (République d'Haïti 2006:11). Haiti is also the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere (CIA 2007).

With knowledge about the general state of the institutions and the socioeconomic structures, I will now turn to the actors, and their efforts and intentions in terms of meeting the criteria outlined by Paris. As I pointed out in the introduction to this chapter, however, the mandates and responsibilities of the different actors are not the same, and therefore each one of them cannot be expected to focus on *all* the elements of the IBL-strategy.

### **6.2.1 The Group of 184**

As to the first element on Paris' list, when the Group of 184 was officially created in 2002, the signatories declared their joint position concerning seven different criteria that had to be met before elections could be held. The points concern freedom of speech; disarmament of everyone with connection to the armed groups including police and other public authorities with such connections; action against gang-leaders; enlargement of prisons; to stop declarations of hate and violence from those in power; to make it possible for those who have been terrorised by the armed groups to return to their activities; and international cooperation in issues related to security (Alterpresse 2002). It is quite safe to say that those criteria were not met before the elections were held in 2006, and the recommendations of the Group of 184 correspond with those of the International Crisis Group: "Accepting the formality of elections without substance", it was argued, "could drive Haiti into failed state status, vulnerable to takeover by drug and criminal networks" (International Crisis Group 2005b:10).

Concerning Paris' fourth point, in addition to the abovementioned focus on putting an end to declarations of hate and violence in the declaration of the creation, the New Social Contract underlines the importance of solving conflicts by dialogue rather than violence. When it comes to the fifth point, the Contract argues in favour of a more dynamic and modern economy with creation of jobs in agriculture, industry and

services, based on the principle of ‘growth in equity’. As to Paris’ sixth point, the Contract insists on instauration of justice for all citizens with the principles of equality, guarantee of security and access to justice without discrimination. In addition, the Contract also insists on the need for institutionalisation of political life, with focus on the structures of mediation such as parliament, local assemblies, associations and political parties (Collectif Haïti de France 2005).

To sum up, when the New Social Contract was published in 2005, it expressed dissatisfaction with several aspects of the institutional framework. What is Préval’s position concerning the institutional framework? Does he consider it to be effective?

### **6.2.2 Préval**

Préval’s opinion about the moment of the elections and whether the conditions were ripe is arguably not very interesting, since he was in the midst of the campaign, and far from objective on that matter. If he had strong opinions against holding the elections on the given date he could have boycotted them, but given his chances to run off with the victory, that would have been an odd choice.

In relation to Paris’ second element, it is relevant to mention the ongoing debate about presidential terms. The objective of the principle of ‘no re-election’ in the Haitian constitution is supposed to prevent return to authoritarian rule, and in that sense, it rewards moderation. In October 2007, however, Préval proposed changing the constitution to allow presidents to serve two consecutive terms, with the objective of bringing stability to the country. As has been pointed out above, the constitution limits presidents to two terms, and there must be a break of at least five years between those terms. Préval’s proposal consists in allowing the two terms to follow each other. According to Katz (2007), writing for the Miami Herald, he assured the legislators that the aim was to create stability, not to run for elections again. Préval has already won two non-consecutive terms, and he does not propose any changes to the number of terms. Stability versus moderation indeed is an interesting and relevant

debate in a conflict-ridden society with a political history marked by authoritarian rule.

When it comes to controlling hate speech, it is tempting to compare Préval's general appearance with that of his predecessor Aristide. Whereas Aristide was characterised as an "outspoken figure" (Robinson 1996:284), who "railed against imperialism and the bourgeoisie in Creole" (Kumar 1998:68), Préval has been described as more vague (Doucet 2007 [personal conversation]).

Nevertheless, Préval has been very clear in his definition of two political orientations, which have been adopted into Prime Minister Alexis' general politics: Construction of a modern state with strengthened democratic institutions and an investment-friendly environment for creation of wealth and jobs for the entire population (Radio Kiskeya 2006:2). The latter is important in relation to the fifth element of the IBL-strategy, namely economic policies that reduce conflict. As has been pointed out on several occasions in this study, social cleavages is a major problem in Haiti, and economic policies that benefit one class or another apparently have represented a source of conflict in the past.

The second orientation of Alexis' general politics can be related to Paris' sixth point. In addition to that very general emphasis on modernisation of the state and strengthening of democratic institutions, Préval on several occasions has expressed particular concern with corruption, criminality, the judicial system and the police. In August 2006 Préval announced that those in possession of arms who did not integrate to the DDR-programme would be disarmed by force, with death as a probable outcome (Collectif Haïti de France 2006b). In an interview with *Le Monde* on June 28 2006, shortly after his inauguration, Préval pointed out international organised crime, national crime and contraband as fundamental factors for the insecurity in Haiti. In that connection he mentioned reorganisation of the HNP with help from the MINUSTAH as well as reconstruction of the judicial system as necessary measures to get rid of the problems (Caroit 2006).

In relation to Hypothesis 1 the discussion touched upon the growing problem of drugs, and how it influences the conflict. The problem of drugs indeed is relevant to this discussion about the quality of state institutions because it is intimately related to the efficiency of the police and the judicial system – as noted above, HNP-officers have been involved in drug trafficking and criminal networks. In January 2007 Préval declared drugs as Haiti's new enemy. In March Préval attained the Regional Summit on Drugs, Security and Cooperation in Santo Domingo. At the summit Préval and his Dominican colleague Leonel Fernandez criticised the US for not supporting them in forbidding speedboats and flights from Colombia and Venezuela. This is a great problem in Haiti since cocaine packages are dropped in the sea near the Haitian coastline or on clandestine landing stripes (International Crisis Group 2007b:18). In July 2007 Préval attained the 28<sup>th</sup> Summit of the CARICOM in Barbados. Haiti was not member of the community at that time, but according to Collectif Haïti de France (2007d), through membership Haiti would be forced to implement measures against trafficking of drugs and arms, matters that concern the stability of the entire region. In October 2007 the Haitian Parliament signed the treaty of the CARICOM (Collectif Haïti de France 2007i).

Related to the problem of drugs, is the problem of corruption. In May 2007 Préval announced the launching of a campaign against corruption. "The mission of our ancestors was to obtain liberty, our mission is to realise equality (...). The corrupt are treacherous in this battle for equality", he affirmed (Collectif Haïti de France 2007c, my translation).

To sum up, the sixth point of the IBL-strategy is particularly present on Préval's agenda. In an interview in *Le Monde*, in the summer of 2006 Préval again shed light on the importance of institutional reform, but then in relation to the planned redefinition of MINUSTAH's mandate – which became a reality with Resolution 1743 of 15 February 2007:

...it will no longer be a peace-restabilising mission, but a mission that maintains the peace through strengthening institutions such as police and justice, precisely to prepare for MINUSTAH's departure (...) the MINUSTAH should work (...) I would

almost say, under the supervision of the Haitian Government. (Le Monde 2006, my translation)

That leads the discussion over to the UN, and the organisation's approach to Haiti's institutional framework.

### **6.2.3 The UN**

Of Paris' six points, the first and the last in particular have attracted the attention of the UN and hence influenced the mandate of the MINUSTAH. As to the first point, in Resolution 1608 of June 22 2005, the Security Council – quite contrary to the recommendations from the Group of 184 – stressed that “free and fair elections (...) must take place in 2005 in accordance with the established timetable...”(United Nations Security Council 2005). Nevertheless, the Resolution stated a temporary increase in the MINUSTAH's strength in order to provide security during the electoral period (United Nations Security Council 2005). In Resolution 1702 of August 2006 it was also decided to assist in matters concerning security, logistics and technique in the organisation of legislative, local and municipal elections (United Nations Security Council 2006d).

In Resolution 1702 emphasis was also put on factors concerning Paris' sixth point, namely MINUSTAH's contribution to strengthen the capacities of the HNP; realisation of a complete programme against violence including employment-opportunities for former gang-members and other risk groups as well as adaptation of the DDR-programme to local conditions (United Nations Security Council 2006d). The UN's concern with institutional matters was in the centre of attention when in January 2007 the MINUSTAH presented the plan for the activities of the year, focusing on reform of public institutions, justice, the prisons<sup>28</sup> and the HNP, and contribution to action on human rights-issues. Sophie Boutaud, spokeswoman for the

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<sup>28</sup> Haitian prisons are in a deplorable state. On average, each inmate has 0.77 m2 of space, in some cases less than 0.5 m2. Less than 10% of the 5500 inmates in Haiti's prisons have been convicted, many have not even been charged. Diseases spread rapidly and access to water and food is insufficient (International Crisis Group 2007a)



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MINUSTAH, declared that “We now have to work with the consolidation of the state of law and support the Haitian authorities in the reform of institutions” (Collectif Haïti de France 2007a, my translation).

Resolution 1743 of February 15 2007 called for a strengthening of the state institutions at all levels, in particular those outside Port-au-Prince. To achieve this, the MINUSTAH was to provide specialised expertise to central ministries. Another point was continued support of the HNP against armed gangs, with emphasis on the need to accelerate the efforts in the DDR-programme. Along with reform of the HNP, the MINUSTAH was to support the Haitian authorities in reforming important elements of justice- and corrections sectors (United Nations Security Council 2007).

Pierre (2007:9-14) states the hardly disputable fact that the limits of the MINUSTAH are to be found in the complexity of the problem. According to him, Resolution 1743 and its emphasis on *security* measures hence shows that the Security Council recognises a progress in the Haitian *political* process, in the sense that various sectors of society seem to be more open to political dialogue than earlier. According to Pierre, Resolution 1743 thus aims at institutionalising a new normative order based on social and political responsibility.

On August 1 2007 UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon visited Haiti. He urged Haiti to strengthen the rule of law in order to consolidate achievements in security matters, and encouraged Préval in his fight against corruption as well as the authorities’ initiatives on judicial reform: “The time has come to rebuild the institutions that have been destroyed by years of neglect, corruption and violence, to strengthen them so that the State is able to deliver the services that the people need” (United Nations 2007a). Ban (2007a) argued that the security situation has improved since the elections, but that there still is a way to go in matters such as drug trafficking, organised crime, state institutions and rule of law. Arguing that rule of law has positive effects upon the culture of democracy as well as political stability and economic growth, Ban promised that the UN – through the MINUSTAH and divers UN Funds and Programmes – will assist in those areas. In lines with Paris’ fifth point

and Préval's focus on creation of wealth and jobs for all Haitians, he also underscored the importance of decent jobs and socioeconomic equality for achieving peace.

#### **6.2.4 Summing up: To what extent were the IBL-criteria met?**

When it comes to the moment for the elections, there were two different positions: The Group of 184 represented one of the positions, arguing – in accordance with Paris – in favour of postponing elections until the situation permitted them to take place (Alterpresse 2002). The other position was represented by the UN, contending that postponement should be avoided at any price (United Nations Security Council 2005). But were the elections held too early? Although irregularities occurred during the elections, and a controversial method had to be used for calculating the votes, such problems arguably might have been hard to avoid even if the elections were further postponed. Above I argued that the criteria outlined by the Group of 184 in the declaration of the creation in 2002 were not met before the elections. However, if they were to be met, Haiti would most probably have been governed by the interim government for quite a while before a democratically elected government could take place. The International Crisis Group (2005b:10) pointed to the danger of Haiti becoming a failed state ruled by criminal networks if the elections were held too early. Towards the end of the delimited time period for this study, more than one and a half year after the first round elections, the security situation seemingly has improved rather than deteriorated (Ban 2007b, Schneider 2007). Therefore, I would argue that the elections were not held too early, the Haitian context taken into consideration.

Regarding the second element of the IBL-strategy, the Haitian electoral system does reward moderation, in the sense that the constitution bans two consecutive terms. Nevertheless, as I argued above, Préval has proposed a constitutional amendment which consists in allowing for two consecutive terms (Katz 2007). His proposal is supposed to favour the principle of stability. However, as his proposal does not

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challenge the existing limit of two presidential terms, it still rewards moderation as it sets a maximum limit of ten years for the presidency.

When it comes to the fourth criteria, clear references to the question of hate speech are hard to find in the literature, but it seems like this criteria to a larger degree is met under Préval than it was under Aristide.

In the introduction to this section I showed that Haiti has not had a tradition for conflict-reducing economic policies, and the large majority of the population lives in poverty (République d'Haïti 2006:11). In the discussion related to Hypothesis 1 I argued that the socioeconomic differences contribute to keep the conflict alive. However, there seems to be an increasing awareness and will related to the need for a change in this domain, and one of the guidelines for Alexis' government, which is designed by Préval, concerns creating a climate favourable for investment in order to create jobs and wealth for the entire population. I have also argued that since education according to the World Bank (2006:18) is the most important poverty-reducing factor in Haiti, Préval and the Group of 184's shared focus on education for all (Collectif Haïti de France 2005; Renois 2006) indirectly are conflict-reducing initiatives within the economic realm.

When it comes to the institutional realm, all the actors chosen for this analysis recognise the need for efforts in order to strengthen institutions in general and in the justice and corrections sectors particularly. Resolution 1743, the last resolution to be covered by this study, marked a shift in the focus of the UN, to security measures from the political process, compared to previous resolutions. According to Pierre (2007:9), that shift was due to observed progress in the political progress in terms of dialogue and national reconciliation. Hence, it seems like the criteria outlined by Cousens and Kumar to a greater extent have been met than the ones elaborated by Paris, and that leads the discussion towards a conclusion.

## 6.3 Conclusion

This chapter has dealt with Hypothesis 3, which was elaborated from the theoretical core of this study. That core was constituted of two different approaches: Roland Paris' generally applicable IBL-strategy, which focuses on the necessity of an effective institutional framework in a peace-building process, and Elizabeth Cousens and Chetan Kumar's recommendations for peace-building in Haiti. The latter emphasises broad-based dialogue and compromise among actors from the political society, the international community and civil society as important for consolidation of peace in Haiti.

The presentation of the strategies and actions of the three chosen actors shows that they all do recognise the importance of dialogue compromise and institutional reform. In the discussion related to Hypothesis 1, I argued that Aristide, by refusing to compromise with his opponents during his last term, slowly but surely began to dig his own grave, but he also fired up under an already existing conflict. The focus on dialogue that is shared by Préval, the Group of 184 and the UN is undoubtedly a positive sign as far as peace-building is concerned. When it comes to the institutional framework, however, it still suffers from severe weaknesses, but the need for reform of institutions – at least in the justice and corrections sectors – is underscored by all the actors. If the opposition allows the government to complete its term this time, that will increase the continuity and the probability of things being done.

Hypothesis 3 postulates that peace is being built if there is broad-based dialogue, compromise and an effective institutional framework. There seems to be a growing tendency of dialogue and compromise, and at least awareness of the need for effective institutions and political will to do something in the institutional domain. The institutional framework still has a way to go before it can be called 'effective'. However, in particular the actors' shared focus on dialogue and compromise, with peace as the long-term objective, seems to strengthen Hypothesis 3.

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## 7 Findings and concluding remarks

The research question of this study was twofold. The objective of the study was to assess the prospects for durable peace in Haiti, and in order to do that, knowledge about the ongoing conflict and the prerequisites for peace was necessary. The first, and most general, research question was: *What are the prerequisites for lasting peace in Haiti?* The second question, which was more specific, concerned the peace-building process and the role of a chosen set of actors: *What do actors from the political scene, civil society and the international community do to contribute to a successful process of peace-building? Do their strategies converge?*

Regarding the focus on actors in the second research question, I chose to focus on President Préval, the Group of 184 and the UN. The choices were grounded in my evaluation of the importance of the roles played by those actors on the Haitian scene within the delimited time period, stretching from February 29 2004, when the then President Aristide was ousted from the country, until October 15 2007, when UN Resolution 1743 ran out. Aristide's last presidential term had been remarkably violent and turbulent, and his departure marked the start of a new era in Haiti. Therefore I considered it was a natural point of departure for an analysis of the prospects for peace. The choice of the end of the period was of a more practical nature – I wanted to analyse strategies and events as close to present as possible. However, the frames I set around the time period and the choice of actors did not definitively exclude other actors and events that occurred before February 29 2004 from the analysis. Rather, the delimited time period served as a foundation for the choice of actors, and most of their strategies and actions that are analysed took place within that time-span. Events that occurred at earlier dates served to provide background material for the analyses.

The analysis was constructed around a theoretical framework which consisted of three different theoretical propositions. The first one referred to Thomas Hobbes, and related the conflict in Haiti to absence of the popular consent – or legitimacy – that is necessary to unite the people under a democratically elected sovereign. The

democratically elected sovereign was defined as the Haitian presidency. In order to assess whether the popular consent for the sovereign has increased during the delimited time period for this analysis, I compared the legitimacy of Aristide and Préval at decisive moments. The findings from that comparison suggested that among the chosen actors an increase in the legitimacy of the presidency had taken place since Aristide's departure. However, although the situation reportedly has become more stable, it would be simplistic to relate the increase in legitimacy among three different actors – of which one was even a part of the comparison – directly to a decrease in the level of the conflict. Therefore I also discussed other elements that contribute to keep the conflict alive, in particular the violent gangs, the frail institutional framework, the socioeconomic inequalities, and the weak democratic foundation that carries the institutional framework and the political system.

It seems like the security situation in Haiti improved between February 2004 and October 2007 and that indeed is an important and encouraging finding. The legitimacy of the Haitian presidency apparently also was strengthened during that period. Importantly, though, lack of consent for the sovereign – to use Hobbes' words – does not seem to be the only factor with impact on the Haitian conflict.

The second theoretical proposition was related to Haiti's civil society and the assumption that a solution to the conflict is dependent on the existence of an active civil society and social capital. The assumption was based on a combination of various theories that shed light on advantages related to civil society and social capital, and knowledge about particularities of Haitian civil society that are not convergent with definitions of an active and sound civil society. Through an evaluation of those particularities, I found that many of the violent gangs – that, as I argued in relation to the first part of the analytical framework, contribute to keeping the conflict alive – paradoxically enough are quite close to the civil society. Hence, I argued that Haiti's security situation would benefit from those gangs being effectively included in real civil society organisations.

By assessing the efforts and intentions of the chosen actors in the context of the particularities of Haitian civil society and various mechanisms for absorption into civil society, I found that the actors all recognise the importance of an active and sound civil society. In other words, an active and sound civil society indeed seems to be a central ingredient in durable peace in Haiti, and the three actors chosen for this analysis acknowledge the importance of civil society.

The third, and last, proposition represented the core of the study. It was directly related to peace-building, and postulated that if there is broad-based dialogue and compromise among actors from the three different arenas represented by the chosen actors, and if the institutional framework is effective, it indicates that peace is being built.

Dividing the analysis in two parts, I first discussed the question of broad-based dialogue and compromise, which was based on Cousens and Kumar's recommendations for peace-building in Haiti. Again based on the strategies and efforts of the chosen actors, I found that there indeed is a strong focus on broad-based dialogue and compromise among those actors, and peace seems to be a common objective that is shared by the three of them. The second part of the proposition concerned the institutional framework, and whether it is effective. In relation to the first part of the analytical framework, and the question of factors that have an effect on the conflict, I found that the institutional framework is in a poor condition. In order to evaluate the quality of the institutional framework with more depth, and to structure the discussion of the chosen actors' efforts and intentions on the matter, I relied on five of the six points of Paris' IBL-strategy for peace-building. The impression of a weak and ineffective institutional framework was indeed strengthened. Nevertheless, I also found that the actors all recognise the need for reform on the matter, and they seem to have will and initiative for efforts in the institutional realm.

To return to the research questions, then, and begin with the first one, it seems like the factors comprised in the theoretical propositions all are prerequisites for lasting

peace in Haiti: If the democratically elected sovereign followed the democratic rules, he will be considered legitimate and conflicts over his or her legitimacy arguably will diminish. It seems like effective absorption of gang members into the civil society would have a conflict-dampening effect, and a sound and active civil society that can influence the political process effectively supposedly will have a general positive impact on Haitian politics. In addition, it seems like broad-based dialogue and compromise and an effective institutional framework are necessary ingredients in a process that leads to consolidation of lasting peace. When it comes to the second research question, the findings of this study indicate that the three actors chosen for the study all focus on the central factors in the theoretical propositions, and hence the prerequisites for peace. Although the findings also indicate that there still is a way to go before peace is consolidated, it seems like at least the actors chosen for this study have started to move towards the objective of peace.

However, I find it appropriate and necessary to underscore the findings from this study are only suggestive, and not conclusive in any respect. There are at least three reasons for that: First, in spite of long hours spent in search for data, the empirical foundations for the study – in particular concerning Haitian civil society – still arguably are rather weak. Second, there are many interpretations of reality, and because of the multitude of controversies that characterise the conflict in Haiti, it arguably is an impossible task to construct a fully correct and objective picture of the conflict and prospects for solutions to it. That problem possibly is further enhanced by my own interpretation of the reality in Haiti, which certainly is coloured by my personal experiences. Nevertheless, I have done my best to consult my sources with caution and keep my own mind open. The third reason why the findings are only suggestive is related to the significant and undeniable difference between statements and action. The second research question points at the contribution of the selected set of actors when it comes to building peace. Most of my findings in that connection are founded on statements brought forward by the actors themselves.



Nevertheless, this thesis admittedly represents at least one contribution to the scientific dialogue, namely to present a plausible version of the conflict in Haiti between February 29 2004 and October 15 2007, and the position of some central actors regarding their strategies for managing that conflict authoritatively and legitimately. Although that might appear like a modest contribution, the importance of filling the gaps in the literature should not be ignored. Given the scarcity of literature covering this period and geographical area, the scientific dialogue would simply stop if nobody took the challenge of writing about it. Another, related, contribution of this thesis is to shed light on a forgotten conflict. The conflict receives very little attention in the rest of the world compared to other, more geopolitically important conflicts. However, that is not to say that Haitians are not responsible for their own destiny. There definitely still is a long way to go before peace can be consolidated in Haiti. However, the fact that the selected set of actors for this study generally seem to have somewhat convergent strategies and a particular focus on dialogue and reconstruction of the institutional framework, added to a reported general improvement of the security situation, do indicate a glimmer of hope.



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